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The Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), established in 1993, is a civil society initiative to 
promote an ongoing dialogue between the principal partners in the decision-making and 
implementing process. The dialogues are designed to address important policy issues and to seek 
constructive solutions to these problems. The Centre has already organised a series of such 
dialogues at local, regional and national levels. The CPD has also organised a number of South 
Asian bilateral and regional dialogues as well as some international dialogues. These dialogues 
have brought together ministers, opposition frontbenchers, MPs, business leaders, NGOs, donors, 
professionals and other functional groups in civil society within a non-confrontational 
environment to promote focused discussions. The CPD seeks to create a national policy 
consciousness where members of civil society will be made aware of critical policy issues 
affecting their lives and will come together in support of particular policy agendas which they 
feel are conducive to the well being of the country. 
 
In support of the dialogue process the Centre is engaged in research programmes which are 
both serviced by and are intended to serve as inputs for particular dialogues organised by the 
Centre throughout the year.  Some of the major research programmes of CPD include The 
Independent Review of Bangladesh's Development (IRBD), Governance and 
Development, Population and Sustainable Development, Trade Policy Analysis and 
Multilateral Trading System and Leadership Programme for the Youth. The CPD also 
carries out periodic public perception surveys on policy issues and developmental concerns. 
 
  Dissemination of information and knowledge on critical developmental issues continues to 
remain an important component of CPD’s activities. Pursuant to this CPD maintains an active 
publication programme, both in Bangla and in English. As part of its dissemination 
programme, CPD has decided to bring out CPD Occasional Paper Series on a regular basis. 
Dialogue background papers, investigative reports and results of perception surveys which 
relate to issues of high public interest will be published under its cover. The Occasional Paper 
Series will also include draft research papers and reports, which may be subsequently 
published by the CPD. 
 
The present paper, TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Industry in Bangladesh: Towards a 
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and Multilateral Trading System. This programme aims at strengthening institutional 
capacity in Bangladesh in the area of trade policy analysis, negotiations and implementation. 
The programme, inter alia , seeks  to project the civil society’s  perspectives on the emerging 
issues emanating from the process of globalisation and liberalisation. The outputs of the 
programme will be available to all stakeholder groups including the government and 
policymakers, entrepreneurs and business leaders, and trade and development partners. 
 
The programme has received support from the Canadian International Development 
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and Law (CTPL), Otttawa,Canada. 
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December 15, 2002.  
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TRIPS and the Pharmaceutical Industry in Bangladesh: 




When the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the TRIPS 
Agreement)
1 was concluded at the close of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations in 1993, it represented a remarkable expansion of the international 
framework for intellectual property rights. It imposed enhanced standards for what 
Member states had to protect, including a requirement to protect pharmaceuticals by 
patents.  It also established, for the first time, minimum standards for the enforcement 
of substantive intellectual property rights and subjected all of these obligations to 
binding dispute settlement.  
 
In the negotiations on the agenda for the Uruguay Round, developing countries had 
resisted the inclusion of intellectual property.
2  Traditionally, developing countries 
have not defined their interests as being served by high levels of protection for 
intellectual property rights.  To some extent, this was based on the view that 
intellectual property was more properly understood as the common heritage of human 
kind.  As well, developing country reluctance was motivated by pragmatic concerns 
that higher levels of intellectual property protection would involve a substantial 
commitment of scarce government resources to the administration and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights and would produce a significant net outflow of royalties to 
foreign rights holders and increased domestic prices.  Nevertheless, for reasons 
largely unrelated to any interest they had in intellectual property rights, the 
developing countries consented to the TRIPS Agreement as part of the WTO 
package.
3   
 
In the years following the completion of the Uruguay Round, a consensus among 
developing countries has emerged that the patent rights for pharmaceutical products  
guaranteed by TRIPS are a substantial impediment to the adoption of policies 
necessary to ensure affordable access to medicines for their people.  The monopoly of 
patent holders allows them to impose higher prices for essential drugs on developing 
                                                 
 
 
1 Annex 1C to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, (1994) 33 I.L.M. 
81 [TRIPS Agreement]. 
2 See, for example, statements by delegate of India, Note by the Secretariat, Meeting of Negotiating 
Group of 12-14 July 1989, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, MTN.GNG/NG11/14, 12 September 1989, at para. 79.1. 
3 There were two critical bases for developing country participation in the TRIPS Agreement.   
Addressing intellectual property in the context of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations held out the 
prospect for trade offs with other areas.  Developing countries with little interest in intellectual property 
could seek trade concessions in areas important to them such improved access for their textiles and 
agricultural products in return for accepting intellectual property commitments.  Also, some developing 
countries, particularly the newly industrializing economies, had become interested in improving 
intellectual property protection, not just to create incentives for domestic investment in innovation but, 
more importantly, to attract foreign investment and technology transfer. As discussed below, 
developing countries have subsequently questioned the benefits of this bargain. 
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country consumers.
4  Concerns about this aspect of patent protection have become 
increasingly urgent in light of HIV/AIDs and other pandemics in developing 
countries.   
 
Prior to 2001, the developed countries emphasized other impediments to affordable 
access to medicines insisting on the importance of protecting patents to provide 
incentives to produce new and better drugs.  Led by the United States and the 
European Union, they took a consistently strong position on the necessity for WTO 
members to bring their regimes into conformity with TRIPS, and, indeed, to guarantee 
levels of patent protection exceeding those required under TRIPS.
5  By 2001, 
however, propelled by the unified voices of developing countries, both developed and 
developing country Members of the WTO had embarked on a process at the WTO to 




At the Doha Ministerial Meeting in November 2001, the concerns of developing 
countries were clearly and formally recognized in the Ministerial Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Pubic Health [Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health].
7  The Members agreed that TRIPS can and should be interpreted in a manner 
supportive of Members’ rights to protect public health and promote access to 
medicines for all.  There is now widespread consensus on the need to ensure that 
TRIPS adequately addresses access to medicines.  Subsequent discussions in Geneva 
have centred on how this may be done — a remarkable change in developed country 
attitudes.
8  There is not yet, however, a consensus on a solution.
9
 
A key issue for Bangladesh in this context is to what extent existing as well as 
possible new TRIPS rules create an opportunity for the development of policies to 
                                                 
4 As discussed below, access to affordable medicines is, however, a complex, multi-dimensional 
problem.  Obstacles to access include patents but are also related to financing, supply and distribution 
systems and pricing practices by multinational drug businesses. 
5 The United States initiated dispute settlement proceedings based on alleged failure to comply with 
TRIPS against India (India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 
Report of the Appellate Body, AB-1997-5 (WT/DS50/AB/R))[India Patents], Brazil  (Brazil-Measures 
Affecting Patent Protection, Request for Establishment of a Panel by U.S., 2001 (WT/DS199/3)) and 
Argentina (Argentina - Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Test Data Protection for 
Agricultural Chemicals, Request for Consultations by the U.S., 1999 (WT/DS171/1)).  Outside of 
WTO dispute settlement, the United States has put pressure on other developing countries, including 
Ghana, and South Africa to provide protection higher than required by TRIPS. See, F.M. Abbott, “The 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health:  Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO,” 
(2002) 5 J. Int’l Econ. Law 469, at 471 & 475 and P. Champ and A. Attaran “Patent Rights and Local 
Working Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S. Brazil Patent Dispute” (2002), 
27 Yale J. Int’l L. 365 [Champ & Attaran]. 
6 Frederick Abbot identifies the decision of the TRIPS Council to hold a special session on access to 
medicines in June 2001 as the starting point of the process (ibid., at 481). 
7 November 12, 2001 (WT/NIN(01)/DEC/2)[Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health]. 
8 Abbott, above note 5, and S. K. Sells, “Post-TRIPS Developments: The Tension Between 
Commercial and Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property Rights,” (2002) 14 Florida J. 
Int’l L. 193. 
9 Recently, this consensus was evident at a meeting of 25 trade ministers held in Sydney Australia in 
November 2002 where agreement was reached on key issues related to compulsory licensing (Virginia 
Marsh “Cheap drugs for the poor deal boosts trade talks” Financial Times, 17 November, 2002, at 2).  
As discussed below, the deadline for agreeing on specific action on this issue, 31 December 2002, 
passed without any resolution.  See note 65 and accompanying text. 
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encourage the growth of its domestic pharmaceutical industry.  To date, the 
international community has not delivered an organized and useful response to the 
health crisis in developing countries.  It would be imprudent for Bangladesh to depend 
on such a response in the future to improve access to affordable medicines.
10  One 
aspect of providing secure continuing access to medicines in Bangladesh could be the 
development of a strong national pharmaceutical industry.  At the same time, a strong 
national industry may provide many high paying jobs and generate substantial export 
earnings. 
 
This paper, seeks to set out the constraints and opportunities that TRIPS patent rules 
represent for Bangladesh regarding the strategies it may adopt to further develop its 
national pharmaceutical industry.  The pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh is 
already the largest in the least-developed countries, but it does not have the research 
capacity to invent new pharmaceutical products, nor does it have the imitative 
capacity to reverse engineer patented drugs in order to develop competing generic 
products.
11  Instead, the principal activity of the domestic industry is the final 
production of generic products using imported generic active ingredients.  These 
products are sold primarily to the domestic market.  Under TRIPS rules, the supply of 
generic active ingredients may be cut off as a result of TRIPS requirement that the 
developing countries in which most of the generic producers reside grant full patent 
protection by 1 January 2005.  Bangladesh does not currently permit the patenting of 
pharmaceutical products.  Patents on drugs would essentially preclude the production 
of generic competing products in Bangladesh.  Under the Doha Declaration on TRIPS 
and Public Health, Bangladesh, along with all other least-developed countries, is not 
required to grant such protection until 2016.  Given this context, will generic 
producers in other countries that do not benefit from the extension invest in building 
productive capacity in Bangladesh, and assist the domestic industry to acquire the 
skills to develop new generic drugs?  Does the extended deadline mean that the 
industry can not only continue its existing final production business but also expand 
export sales, especially in other least developed countries that also benefit from the 
extension?   
 
Finding answers to these important questions requires a close examination of the 
complex provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the likely impact of the 
implementation of its obligations not only in Bangladesh but also in other countries.  
In order to provide an appropriate context for this examination, I will first describe the 
rationale for patent protection of pharmaceuticals and its flaws in relation to 
developing and least-developed countries. 
 
                                                 
10 Abbott is also of this view, above note 5. 
11 Typically generic drugs are developed by someone who reverse engineers a patented drug invented 
by someone else to discover its chemical composition and then creates their own drug based on the 
same chemical composition. For the purposes of this paper a “generic product” or “generic drugs” 
means pharmaceutical product that has the same chemical composition as another pharmaceutical 
product or would otherwise infringe the patent rights of a person owning a valid patent on the second 
product.  Where no valid patent exists in a national jurisdiction (whether because the national law of 
that jurisdiction does not recognize patents on pharmaceutical products, the person entitled has not 
applied for a patent, or the patent has expired) or a compulsory licence has been issued, “generic 
products” and “generic drugs” refer to pharmaceutical products that would infringe if a valid patent did 
exist and was enforceable against the producer of the generic product or drug or anyone else exploiting 
the product or drug in that national jurisdiction. 
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BACKGROUND: RATIONALE FOR PATENT PROTECTION OF 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
 
Protection of pharmaceuticals by patents under national laws is justified by developed 
countries as being necessary to encourage investment in research and development 
leading to the invention and commercialisation of new products.
12  Without the 
benefit of patent protection, anyone who is able to acquire knowledge regarding the 
composition of a pharmaceutical product developed by someone else through reverse 
engineering can develop a competing generic product based on the same composition.  
Those who do so have a competitive advantage over the innovator because they have 
not incurred the research and development costs associated with creating the original 
product.  They may sell their competing generic products at a price lower than the 
price the innovator needs to charge for the original to cover the additional costs he or 
she has incurred.  Sales of generic products by someone other than the innovator 
reduce the economic benefit of innovation to the innovator since they are sales the 
innovator might otherwise have made.  The incentive for the innovator to invest in 
research and development leading to new pharmaceutical products will be reduced to 
the extent that the return on such an investment may be eroded by competition from 
generic products.   
 
Patents permit the innovator to exclude others from exploiting the new 
pharmaceutical product for a period of time and, as a result, to recover the costs of 
research and development.  In this way, patents encourage innovators to innovate.  In  
an international context, patents encourage foreign direct investment for the purposes 
of innovation and the exploitation of patented technology in countries that protect 
 patents. A further justification for patent protection is that disclosure of the patent is a 
condition of obtaining the statutory monopoly represented by the patent.  Disclosure 
may be of assistance to subsequent innovators who will seek to improve on the 
original product. 
 
The theoretical and empirical underpinnings of this classical rationale for patent 
protection of pharmaceuticals may be questioned.  First, while the new and better 
products resulting from innovation are clearly a benefit to society, at some point 
investment in innovation will not be as socially valuable as other investments.  In 
theory, at some level of patent protection, investment in innovation will become 
excessive and patent protection should be less than that level.  Unfortunately it is 
difficult to know how much innovation is excessive.  Second, even assuming one was 
able to know what the optimal amount of innovation activity is, setting the scope, 
duration and other characteristics of patent protection to ensure that the optimal 
                                                 
 
 
12 For a more fully elaborated analysis of this problem of market failure in the case of goods containing 
intellectual property see S. Besen and L.J. Raskind, “An Introduction to the Economics of Intellectual 
Property Protection,” (1991) 5 J. of Econ. Perspectives at 5-6, M. Hart, “Getting Back To Basics: 
Reinventing Patent Law for Economic Efficiency,” (1994) 8 Can. Intell. Prop. J. 217; K. Dam, “The 
Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law,” (1994) 23 J. of Legal Studies 247 [Dam] .    T h e  
pharmaceutical industry, above all others, depends on patent protection because it is relatively easy to 
reverse engineer a pharmaceutical product.  See R.P. Merges and R.R. Nelson, “On the Complex 
Economics of Patent Scope,” (1990) 90 Columbia L. Rev. 839 [Merges & Nelson] and Report of the 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development 
Policy (London, 2002)[Barton Commission] at 31. 
TRIPS and the Pharmaceutical Industry in Bangladesh: Towards a National Strategy                             6CPD Occasional Paper 24 
amount takes place is problematic.
13  One of the reasons for this is that, while high 
levels of intellectual property protection may encourage innovation in the first 
instance, the protection granted an innovator will act as a barrier to those seeking to 
develop innovations which build on his or her innovation as well as encouraging 
wasteful investment in the development of substitute technologies by those seeking to 
compete with the innovator.
14  In order to facilitate a continuous process of 
innovation at optimal levels consideration must be given to the need for access to 
innovations for subsequent innovators to use the patented product to take the next 
innovative step.
15  While such use may always be allowed with the consent of the 
patent holder, the patent holder has an incentive to use the patent monopoly to refuse 




Moreover, in addition to whatever benefits to creators and the public may result from 
pharmaceutical innovations stimulated by patents, there are also significant costs 
associated with granting patents.  These are the costs associated with all monopolies: 
decreased production, higher prices, and more limited product differentiation.
17  In 
 terms of prices, there is strong evidence that prices fall when drugs go off patent.  
The degree of price reduction depends on the number of generic competitors.
18 There 
is also the public cost of administering a patent system.  A state must generate and 
continually update its laws dealing with intellectual property as well as providing the 
legal infrastructure for registering and enforcing patents. 
   
In terms of setting national policy, the costs associated with patents and the benefits 
of patent protection are notoriously difficult to measure.  Economists have had 
difficulty describing the precise ways in which the incentives created by patents 
operate.
19  There is no consensus on the magnitude of the effect of patents on research 
and development, much less on economic growth or social welfare.  While, in theory, 
weak intellectual property protection reduces incentives to innovate, one cannot 
                                                 
13 D. McFetridge and M. Raffiquzzaman in “The Scope and Duration of the Patent Right and the 
Nature of Research Rivalry,” (1986) 8 Res. L. & Econ. 91 address this issue. 
14 Merges & Nelson, above note 12; Economic Council of Canada, Report on Intellectual and 
Industrial Property (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) at 36.  
15 Merges and Nelson, ibid., at 868-884.  See also E. Kitch, “The Nature and Function of the Patent 
System,” (1977) 20 J. L & Econ. 265, for a differing view. 
16 An example of the conflict between those securing a patent right and subsequent innovation is the 
conflict between plant breeders and the research and agricultural sectors.  Plant breeders favour broad 
patent protection for plant varieties while the research and agriculture communities fear that such high 
levels of protection would limit their access to new varieties (Science Council of Canada, Innovation 
and Intellectual Property Rights in Canada (Ottawa: Science Council of Canada, 1990), at 23-5). 
17 K. Maskus, “Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights: Domestic and International 
Dimensions,” in GLOBAL  RIVALRY AND INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY:  DEVELOPING  CANADIAN 
STRATEGIES (Toronto: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1990), at 121-122.  Dam, above note 12, 
at 249-253. 
18 Barton Commission, above note 12, at 36.  The absence of patent protection in India after 1970 
stimulated the development of one of the world’s strongest generic industries.  See T. Ali, “Intellectual 
Property: Its Implications for Economic and Cultural Growth,” presented to Centre for Policy 
Dialogue,  Dialogue on Doha Declaration on WTO-TRIPS and Public Health: What is in it for 
Bangladesh? held in Dhaka, Bangladesh December 15, 2002 [Ali], at 5) 
19 Indeed some commentators have noted that economists have come to diametrically opposite 
conclusions on the manner in which intellectual property rights work (See J. Boyle, "A Politics of 
Intellectual Property" Working Paper, Legal Theory Workshop Series, University of Toronto, Faculty 
of Law, September 1996). 
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justify theoretically, empirically or in any other way the 20-year patent monopoly set 
out in TRIPS as optimal for global welfare. 
 
In addition to these general problems with the rationale for patent protection, there are 
various concerns about patents specific to developing and least-developed countries.  
Patent rules will not benefit all countries in the same way that liberalizing rules for 
trade in goods and services will.
20  It is impossible to generalize regarding the impact 
of moving to stronger patent protection on economic growth in developed and 
developing countries or even amongst developing countries.  There will be both costs 
and benefits, and they will vary from one country to the next.  The “one size fits all” 
approach in the TRIPS Agreement fails to acknowledge this basic reality. 
 
One key variable affecting the benefits of patent protection in a particular country will 
be to what extent patent protection will encourage domestic businesses to innovate.  
The economic benefits from patent led innovation will be small where local producers 
lack innovative capacity.
21 Another key factor affecting the impact of stronger patent 
rules will be the responsiveness of foreign investors.  Strengthened patent protection 
can encourage the flow of technologies and products from developed to developing 
countries though licensing and foreign direct investment.  Some recent evidence 
suggests that improved intellectual property rules did result in increased foreign direct 
investment in Chile and Malaysia.  In most research to date, however, it has proven 
difficult to isolate effects related to intellectual property rights as distinct from other 
locational advantages for foreign investors.
22  Uncertainty regarding the benefits of 
intellectual property protection reduces developing country interest in spending scarce 
state resources on the recognition and enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
   
Finally, market-based incentives like patents are likely to be inadequate to stimulate 
optimal levels of innovation by foreign or domestic firms to meet the needs of poor 
countries.  Patent rights will encourage investment in developing new and better 
pharmaceutical products for which there is sufficient commercial demand.  Patent 
rights will not stimulate investment in improvements to medicines to treat diseases 
suffered primarily by resource poor consumers in developing countries.  Other 
policies integrated into a broad based program promoting public and private 
investment in technology and human resources through education and skills 
development, as well as publicly funded research will be needed to support 
development of such products.
23  
 
As discussed in more detail in the remainder of this paper, the inherent weaknesses of 
the classical rationale for patent protection of pharmaceuticals, and its particular 
inapplicability to a least-developed country like Bangladesh, means that developing 
national strategies to benefit from the patent obligations in TRIPS is a complex and 
daunting challenge. 
                                                 
20  M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, THE  REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL  TRADE, 2d ed. (London: 
Routledge, 1999), at 310-312. 
21 As discussed below, this is the case currently in Bangladesh.  See below note 81 and accompanying 
text. 
22 Indeed one study suggests that weak intellectual property protection encourages foreign direct 
investment since foreign intellectual property rights holders will choose this form of market entry over 
licensing because it gives them greater control over the exploitation of their intellectual property 
(Intellectual Property and Foreign Direct Investment (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1973). 
23 Barton Commission, above note 12, at 31-2. 
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FROM TRIPS TO DOHA AND BEYOND:  THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME 
FOR PATENT PROTECTION OF PHARMACEUTICALS 
 
The following paragraphs describe each of the basic TRIPS obligations relating to the 
patent protection of pharmaceuticals as well as the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health which addressed some aspects of how those TRIPS provisions are to 
operate.  As well, the possible future evolution of the TRIPS rules is discussed.  The 
purpose of this section is to sketch the framework of international rules which define 
both the context within which the pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh must 
operate, and the scope for Bangladesh to establish policies to promote the 
development of the domestic industry. 
 
1.  The Obligation to Provide Patent Protection  
 
The TRIPS Agreement requires that WTO Members make patent protection available 
to products and processes in all fields of technology, including pharmaceutical 
products, wherever invented for 20 years from the date the application for patent 
protection is filed.  Patents for processes must extend to products directly obtained 
from the process.
24  Patent protection for a product must give the owner the exclusive 
right to prevent third parties from “making, using, offering for sale, selling, or 
importing for these purposes” the product without the owner’s consent.
25  Members 
must require that an applicant for a patent disclose the invention in a manner 
sufficiently clear and complete to permit the invention to be carried out by a person 
skilled in the art.  Members may require an applicant to provide information 
concerning the applicant’s corresponding foreign applications and grants.
26   
 
Members can refuse to grant patents for inventions if their commercial exploitation 
would endanger ordre public or morality, including human, animal or plant life or 
health or the environment.  Members can also exclude from patentability diagnostic, 
therapeutic and surgical methods, plants and animals (other than micro-organisms) 
and biological process for the production of plants or animals (other than micro-
biological processes).
27   
 
For developed countries, such as Canada, these obligations became binding on 
January 1, 1996.
28  Developing countries, such as India, were given until 2000 to 
bring their national regimes into compliance with TRIPS.  Developing country 
Members, like India, that did not make available patent protection for pharmaceutical 
products benefited from a special transition period extending the deadline for the 
granting of patent protection for pharmaceutical products to 2005.
29  In the case of 
least-developed countries, like Bangladesh, TRIPS provides that they are not obliged 
                                                 
24 TRIPS Art. 27. 
25 TRIPS Art. 28.1.  As discussed below, the importation right is subject to Art. 6 which, in effect, 
provides that each country is free to establish national rules regarding when a product sold or otherwise 
disposed of in one jurisdiction may thereafter be imported into another.  See “Exhaustion and Parallel 
Importing” below notes 66 & 67 and accompanying text. 
26  Disclosure is required under TRIPS Art. 29.  For the most part, TRIPS does not address the 
administration of national patent regimes.  
27 TRIPS Art. 27.2 and 27.3. 
28 TRIPS Art. 65.1. 
29 TRIPS Art. 65.4. 
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to grant patent protection or comply with most other obligations until 2006.
30   In the 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health issued by the Ministerial Conference 
Meeting at Doha, Qatar in November 2001, the Members of the WTO agreed that 
least-developed country Members will not be obliged to implement TRIPS obligations 
regarding patents on pharmaceutical products or their enforcement until 1 January 
2016.  The right of least-developed countries to seek further extensions under Article 
66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement was also affirmed.
31  
 
2.  Articles 7 and 8 – TRIPS Interpretive Rules 
 
The TRIPS Agreement sets out several general principles to guide the interpretation 
and enforcement of TRIPS rules, including the rules regarding patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals.  Article 7 establishes that the protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights should operate not just for the benefit of some developed 
nations who are net exporters of goods and services to which intellectual property 
rights attach but rather “to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technology 
in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and a balance of rights and 
obligations.”  As well, intellectual property rights protection should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology. Article 1 provides that in pursuit of these objectives Members are free to 
determine the appropriate method of implementing TRIPS provisions within their 
own legal system and practice.   
 
Article 8 specifically contemplates that Members may adopt measures to promote the 
public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development.  Article 8 is subject to an important proviso, however.  
Such measures must be consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.  Thus 
Article 8 is merely an interpretive guide, not an exception to rights otherwise 
guaranteed in the agreement.  
 
In the small number of WTO dispute settlement cases to date, these provisions have 
been referred to as informing the interpretation of TRIPS.
32  The necessity of 
interpreting TRIPS in light of its objectives and purpose as expressed in Articles 7 and 
8 was confirmed in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.
33
 
3.  WTO Members’ Ability to Impose Reasonable Limits on Patent 
Rights 
                                                 
30 TRIPS Art. 66.1 
31 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, above note 7, para. 7.  The extension also applies to 
obligations with respect to the protection of undisclosed information under TRIPS Art. 39.  TRIPS Art. 
66.1 gives the TRIPS Council authority to grant such extensions.  The TRIPS Council confirmed the 
grant of the extension for all least-developed country Members on 27 June 2002.  See below note 69 
and accompanying text.  At the same meeting, the TRIPS Council approved a waiver of the exclusive 
marketing rights under Art. 70.9, discussed below.  The waiver was submitted to the General Council 
for approval on 8 July 2002.  For some reason, exclusive marketing rights were not addressed in the 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. 
32  E.g., Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, Complaint by the European 
Communities and their Member States, Report of the Panel, 2000 (WT/DS114/R)[Canada-EU Patents] 
at 153.   
33 DOHA Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, above note 7, at para. 5(a).  Such an approach is 
only declaratory of what customary international law would require in any case.  See Abbott, above 
note 5. 
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TRIPS permits Members to create “limited exceptions” to the exclusive rights 
conferred by a patent. This provision recognizes that patent rights cannot be absolute.  
Some exceptions are necessary, such as an exception to permit the use of a patented 
invention for scientific experimentation, a common feature of national patent laws. 
This grant of flexibility is constrained, however, by two further requirements.  Such 
exceptions cannot 
 
•  unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent or 
•  unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking into 
account the legitimate interests of third parties.
34 
 
The scope of this provision was considered by a WTO dispute settlement panel in a 
challenge by the European Union to two provisions of Canada’s patent law.
35  In the 
interests of permitting producers of generic drugs to enter the market as soon as 
possible following the expiration of a patent, Canadian law provided two exceptions 
to the exclusive rights of the patent holder: 
•  any person can make or use a patented invention solely for uses reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information under Canadian law 
regulating a product (the “Regulatory Review Exception”), and 
•  any person can make or use a patented invention for six months prior to the 
expiration of the patent to manufacture and store articles intended for sale after 
the expiry of the patent (the “Stockpiling Exception”).
36 
 
The Regulatory Review Exception is intended to allow producers of generic drugs to 
obtain marketing approval for products based on a patented formulation prior to the 
expiration of the patent with a view to competing with the patented drug as soon as 
the patent expires.  In the absence of this exception, a generic drug producer could 
only apply for marketing approval after the expiry of the patent. Evidence led in the 
case established that the time needed to obtain marketing approval for generic drugs 
in Canada was usually between three and six and one half years.
37  Generic drug 
producers who rely on this exception and obtain marketing approval can begin to sell 
their products as soon as the patent expires rather than having to wait out the 
additional period needed for marketing approval.  The Stockpiling Exception is 
similarly designed to facilitate immediate participation in the market by producers of 
generic drugs upon the expiry of the patent by allowing them to build up an inventory 
of their product in advance of the expiry of the patent. 
 
The Panel found that Article 30 created three distinct tests.  In order to be permitted 
under Article 30, an exception to the rights of a patent holder (i) must be “limited;” 
(ii) must not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent and (iii) 
must not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking 
into account the legitimate interests of third parties.  Also, because Article 30 creates 
                                                 
34 TRIPS Art. 30.  The complete text of TRIPS Art. 30 is set out in Annex 1. 
35 In Canada-EU Patents, above note 32, Canada gave evidence that while patent applications are 
usually filed as soon as an invention is created, the process of development and regulatory approval of 
a drug takes a further eight to 12 years (at 147). 
36 Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, ss. 55.2(1) & (2). 
37 Canda-EU Patents, above note 32. 
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an exception to the rights otherwise guaranteed, Canada was found to have the burden 
of establishing that Article 30 permitted its legislation. 
 
The Panel determined that “limited” should be narrowly interpreted and defined by 
reference to the legal nature of the constraint imposed on the patent owner’s right, not 
its economic impact.  Since there was no limit on the quantity of drugs that could be 
stockpiled within the six-month period, the Panel held that the Stockpiling Exception 
was not limited within the meaning of Article 30 and so was inconsistent with 
Canada’s obligations in relation to patent protection.  By contrast, the Panel found 
that the Regulatory Review Exception was limited because use of the patented 
invention was only for purposes of obtaining regulatory approval, and not for 
commercial exploitation. 
 
In considering whether the Regulatory Review Exception conflicted with the patent 
owner’s “normal exploitation,” the Panel determined that the patent owner’s “normal 
exploitation of the patent” means its commercial exploitation.  The Panel found that 
the Regulatory Review Exception did not interfere with the patent owner’s normal 
exploitation because it did not permit sales or other commercial exploitation of the 
patent during its term.  The Panel acknowledged that, in the absence of the Regulatory 
Review Exception, the period of exclusivity conferred by the patent would be 
extended in practice by the length of time required to obtain marketing approval for a 
generic competitor.  In the Panel’s view, this was not an inherent characteristic of the 
patent but rather the “unintended consequence of the intersection of patent and 
product laws.”
38  Because it did not find that the Regulatory Review Exception was in 
conflict with the rights of patent owners at all, the Panel did not have to consider 
whether the Regulatory Review Exception was reasonable. 
 
With respect to the third criterion, the Panel found that the legitimate interests of the 
patent owner are narrower than the full protection of all its legal rights to exclusivity.  
The Panel acknowledged that the effective term of a pharmaceutical patent was cut 
short by the amount of time that was required to obtain marketing approval for the 
patented product after filing the patent.  The evidence before the Panel showed that 
this loss was between eight and 12 years.  Nevertheless, the conflicting national 
practices with respect to whether this effective patent term reduction was required to 
be compensated in some way meant that avoiding this reduction was not a legitimate 
interest that the Panel was required to take into account.
39  Consequently, the Panel 
determined that the Regulatory Review Exception was permitted under Article 30. 
 
The  Canada-EU Patents case suggests that in any future dispute settlement 
proceeding challenging an exception to the exclusive rights of patent owners provided 
for in a national law, the protection for such an exception provided by Article 30 will 
be interpreted narrowly.  At the same time, the case provides some useful guidance 
regarding what will be found to be acceptable.  One of the criteria would appear to be 
to what extent an exception is found in the national patent laws of most WTO 
Members. 
 
                                                 
38 Ibid., at 161. 
39 The Panel noted that the laws of the EU, US and Switzerland provide for restoration of patent terms 
to compensate for time lost due to the requirement for regulatory approval, while the laws of other 
countries, including Poland and Thailand, as well as Canada, do not (ibid., at 169). 
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4.  WTO Members’ Ability to Grant Compulsory Licenses 
 
The ability of a state to grant compulsory licences has been one of the key issues in 
the debate about how patent rules may be designed so as not to impede access to 
medicines. Under a compulsory licensing regime, the state can require a patent holder 
to grant a licence to some third party or to the state itself on specified terms.
40  In the 
negotiations resulting in the TRIPS Agreement, the U.S. sought to eliminate 
Members’ ability to grant compulsory licenses altogether.  While TRIPS allows 
compulsory licensing, it imposes significant restrictions on the circumstances in 
which compulsory licenses may be granted designed to reduce the degree of 
interference with the patent holder’s rights as much as possible.  These restrictions 
include the following.
41  
•  The prospective licensee must have attempted to obtain a licence from the 
patent holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and, after a 
reasonable time, not been successful in doing so.  This requirement may be 
waived by a Member in the case of “national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.”  
Even in these situations, however, the patent holder must be notified as soon 
as possible of the licence. 
•  The use authorized in the licence shall be “predominantly for the supply of the 
domestic market of the Member authorizing its use.” 
Members are not obliged to apply these first two conditions where the use is 
authorized to remedy a practice determined to be anti-competitive after a judicial or 
administrative process. 
•  The scope and duration of the use authorized in the licence shall be limited to 
the purpose for which it was authorized.  The license must be terminated if 
and when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to 
recur.  The competent national authority shall have the authority to review the 
continued existence of these circumstances. 
•  The use must be non-exclusive. 
•  The patent holder must be paid adequate remuneration, taking into account the 
economic value of the rights licensed. 
•  The legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization of the licence 
shall be subject to judicial review or other independent review. 
TRIPS does not specify the grounds upon which a compulsory licence may be 
granted.  The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health confirms the unlimited 
flexibility of Members to determine when to issue a compulsory licence, subject to 
compliance with the above noted requirements.
42
 
For some large developing countries with well-established and sophisticated 
pharmaceutical industries, like Brazil and India, compulsory licensing of local 
producers will be a viable strategy to obtain better access to medicines within the 
country.  Where the patent holder is not willing to lower prices to an affordable level, 
a compulsory licence permitting a local firm to produce the patented drug may be 
                                                 
40 Compulsory licenses are granted under some national legal systems if, for example, a patent has not 
been worked in the country or to promote distribution and availability. 
41 The complete text of TRIPS Art. 31 is set out in Annex 1. 
42 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, above note 7, para. 5(b). 
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granted.
43  For most developing countries, however, there simply are no local 
producers to licence.  For compulsory licensing to be effective to introduce a more 
competitive market for drugs in these countries, licenses must include the right to 
import from foreign producers of generic drugs.  There is a general consensus that 
Members may issue compulsory licences to import under Article 31.
44  
 
Frequently, however, granting a compulsory licence to import will not assist 
developing countries seeking to acquire medicines at low cost.  The challenge for 
developing countries is to find a reasonably priced source of foreign supply.  Where 
generic competition operates as a result of absence of patent protection in particular 
national markets, generic producers in these markets may be able to make drugs 
available to an importing country for lower prices. India, for example, does not 
currently grant patents on pharmaceutical products and India’s producers are able to 
export to other markets where either product patents are not provided, such as in 
Bangladesh, or compulsory licenses for importing have been granted.  After 2005, 
however, the ground rules for this trade change fundamentally.  By this date, India 
must provide full product patent protection.  Indian producers will not be able to 
continue to supply other countries with drugs protected by patents in India.  India may 
grant compulsory licences for local production, but, in order to comply with TRIPS, 
any compulsory licence must be “predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market.”  Thus, a compulsory licensee could only export the non-predominant portion 
of its production.
45  To permit countries in need of low cost medicines to acquire 
imports through compulsory licensing, it may be necessary for other countries with 
strong generic drug industries, like India, to be able to grant compulsory licenses 
allowing their producers to export a substantial proportion of their production. 
Currently, this would be contrary to TRIPS Article 31(f).
46
 
At Doha, the concerns of developing countries regarding TRIPS compulsory licensing 
rules were addressed in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, though no 
amendments to the TRIPS Agreement were committed to.  In the Doha Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health, the TRIPS Council, the WTO body responsible for the 
operation of TRIPS, was directed to find a solution by December 31, 2002 to the 
problem faced by developing countries with insufficient capacity for pharmaceutical 
manufacturing to make effective use of compulsory licensing. 
                                                 
43 There is ample evidence of the price reductions resulting from competition from generic drug 
producers.  For example, prices for pharmaceuticals in countries in which patent protection is granted 
are up to 41 times higher than in India, where there is no patent protection currently.  This evidence is 
summarized by K. Balasubramaniam in “Access to Medicines and Public Policy Safeguards under 
TRIPS” presented the Centre for Policy Dialogue’s Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on Trade, Intellectual 
Property and Biological Resources in Asia (Dhaka, 19-20 April 2002)[Balasubramaniam]. 
44 This right is even acknowledged by the U.S.  See Second Communication from the United States, 25 
June 2002 (IP/C/W/358)[Second Communication from the US].  As discussed below, the Bangladesh 
industry has limited capacity to develop and produce generic pharmaceuticals. 
45 There is no accepted interpretation of what “predominantly for the supply of the domestic market 
means.”  Abbott, above note 5, has suggested it could mean that at least half of production is for the 
domestic market, or only that production for the domestic market exceeds that for any single national 
export market (at 499). 
46 For Bangladesh, the extension of the deadline for granting patent protection for pharmaceutical 
products means that Article 31(f) imposes no limit on what Bangladesh may permit its producers to do 
until 2016.  As discussed below, Bangladesh producers would be free to export, so long as the 
importing country is permitted to import either because patent protection does not exist or a 
compulsory licence has been issued there.   
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Subsequently, various proposals regarding how this might be done have been 
discussed in the TRIPS Council, including the following: 
•  Amending Article 31 to delete the requirement for compulsory licences to be 
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market;
47 
•  Adopting an agreed interpretation that Article 30 permits Members to allow 
exports by persons, other than the patent owner, to countries in need, as a 
limited exception to the exclusive rights of the patent owner.
48 
•  A waiver of the requirement under Article 31(f) that licences be 
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market. 
•  Agreeing to a moratorium on dispute settlement cases challenging 
compulsory licences to export in certain circumstances.
49 
The December 31, 2002 deadline passed without a consensus on how to resolve the 
problem.
50   
Each proposed solution would have advantages and disadvantages.  An amendment to 
Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement to permit the issuance of a compulsory licence 
for the export of pharmaceuticals to another member to address public health concerns 
in the other member would provide a durable solution based upon which governments 
could develop health care policy. As well, there is a clear process for amendment in 
the WTO Agreements.
51  On the other hand, it raises the prospect of the delicate 
balance represented by the TRIPS Agreement being disturbed and a broader 
discussion of amendments initiated.   
 
Whether or not a broader discussion of TRIPS reform could be avoided, amending 
Article 31(f) has some practical drawbacks.  Relying on compulsory licensing to 
provide affordable access to medicines would mean that a compulsory licence would 
have to be issued for each individual drug in both the exporting and importing country 
                                                 
47 E.g., Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, 20 June 2002 
(IP/C/W/352). 
48 E.g., Communication from Brazil on behalf of Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, China, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela, 21 June 2002 
(IP/C/W/355)[Communication from Brazil]. 
49 E.g., Second Communication from the United States, above note 44. 
50 Apparently, all countries but the U.S. agreed on a solution.  The U.S. did not agree on the conditions, 
which would have to be satisfied for a country to be allowed to grant a compulsory licence to export.  
Subsequently the U.S. unilaterally announced that it would not initiate dispute settlement to enforce 
Art. 31(f) against any country issuing a compulsory licence to export in specified circumstances as 
discussed below note 64 and accompanying text (Communication from the United States: Moratorium 
to Address Needs of Developing and Least-Developed Members with No or Insufficient Manufacturing 
Capacities in the Pharmaceutical Sector, 10 February 2003  (IP/C/W/396/Corr.1) [US Dispute 
Settlement Moratorium]). 
51 Article X of the WTO Agreement sets out the process to be followed to amend the TRIPS 
Agreement.  The details of this process are discussed in Note by the Secretariat: Proposals on 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Thematic 
Compilation, 23 July 2002 (IP/C/W363/Add.1)[Secretariat Compilation].  Essentially, the TRIPS 
Council or any Member may submit a proposed amendment to the Ministerial Conference or, between 
conferences, the General Council, which would then attempt to decide by consensus if the amendment 
should be submitted to Members.  If consensus is not reached within 90 days (or any longer period 
agreed on), the amendment will be submitted to Members if doing so is approved by a 2/3 vote. 
Members may accept an amendment by depositing an instrument of acceptance the Director-General of 
the WTO within a period specified by the Ministerial Conference or General Council.  The amendment 
comes into force when 2/3 of Members have accepted it for those members and on acceptance for the 
remaining Members. 
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to the extent that national patent protection for the drug existed.
52  Access to drugs 
would not be within the sole control of the importing country in need but would 
depend on the exercise of government discretion in another state to issue a licence to 
export.  It would also involve a significant administrative burden, which would be 
onerous for the exporting and importing country alike.  The problem of the payment 
of compensation to the patent holder in both jurisdictions has been raised as an 
additional concern.
53  Would the requirement to pay adequate remuneration based on 
the economic value of the licence mean that the licensee would have to charge prices 
similar to those charged by the patent owner in order to cover its costs?  If so, 
compulsory licensing will not have much impact on access to medicine.  In the 
absence of agreement on what economic value means in this context, the effect of this 
requirement is, at best, uncertain.  
 
There are several related concerns, which may have to be addressed in any such 
amendment.  Would there be a requirement that the right holder be notified and given 
an opportunity to negotiate to supply the market in the importing country member at a 
lower price?  Such a requirement, which has been suggested by the European Union, 
would add to the administrative burden of compulsory licensing.   
 
The most critical developed country concern is that low-priced pharmaceuticals 
imported into one country under an amended Article 31(f) will find their way into 
third country markets and compete with the products of the patent holder. Developed 
countries have suggested that requirements must be imposed on an importing country 
Member with respect to ensuring that re-export to other national markets is not 
permitted.  These requirements could impose a substantial administrative burden on 
importing states.    
 
Another issue is whether Members will be able to decide for themselves whether they 
are in a health care situation such that other Members are permitted to grant a 
compulsory licence to export to them or will they have to meet certain criteria?  The 
following types of criteria have been discussed: 
•  limits on level of development of the importing country; 
•  limits on domestic capacity to produce pharmaceuticals in the importing 
country; and 
•  limits on products or diseases qualifying for compulsory licences to export.
54  
 
The value to importing country Members of allowing other Members to grant 
compulsory licences for the export of pharmaceuticals to them will depend on the 
conditions that are attached.
55
                                                 
52 This is a function of the requirement that compulsory licences must be granted on a case-by-case 
basis (Art. 31(a)).  As discussed below, in some proportion of cases there will be no patent in either the 
exporting or importing country or both. 
53 Communication from Brazil, above note 48. 
54 It was reported that 25 Trade Ministers meeting in Sydney on November 17, 2002 agreed that each 
country should be able to define for itself whether they meet these criteria.  This appeared to represent 
a significant change in the US position (Virginia Marsh “Cheap drugs for the poor deal boosts trade 
talks,” above note 9).  As discussed below, ultimately, the U.S. did not agree that countries should have 
this right.  See below note 65 and accompanying text. 
55 Communication from Brazil, above note 48, suggests that Art. 31(f) could simply be deleted. Some 
have questioned the significance of compulsory licensing as a policy measure.  Amir Attaran notes that 
since TRIPS came into force, not one compulsory licence has been issued in the Southern hemisphere, 
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The alternative of adopting an interpretation of Article 30 which permits Members to 
allow producers to export drugs subject to patents for the purpose of addressing health 
crises in importing countries would avoid the administrative burden of issuing a 
compulsory licence in the exporting country.  To the extent that it could be 
implemented through a ministerial decision, it would likely be more expeditious to 
adopt such an interpretation than obtaining an amendment.
56 Under such a solution, 
national patent laws could simply be amended one time to permit such exports.
57   
 
There are significant difficulties with this approach as well, however.  First, it is not 
clear that such an “interpretation” is properly available given the clear language of 
Article 31(f). As well, the requirement in TRIPS Article 27.1 that patents be available 
without discrimination as to field of technology could be interpreted as prohibiting a 
national patent law provision that limited patent rights for pharmaceutical products.
58   
Second, any interpretation would have to address the same sorts of concerns noted in 
the preceding discussion regarding the proposal to amend Article 31(f).
59
 
The final mechanisms proposed are a moratorium on dispute settlement cases and a 
waiver of the obligation in Article 31(f).  A waiver may be adopted by the Ministerial 
Conference or the General Council with respect to any obligation under the TRIPS 
Agreement “in exceptional circumstances” which must be identified in the waiver.
60  
If the waiver is to extend for a period exceeding one year, it must be reviewed by the 
Ministerial Conference or the General Council not later that one year after it is 
granted and thereafter annually.  The necessity of this annual review would seriously 
undermine the ability of Members to develop long-term health policy.  Public and 
private investment decision-making would be frustrated by the risk that the waiver 
would not be renewed. The United States which supports the use of a waiver or 
moratorium has suggested that amendments and agreed interpretations are not as 
effective because how they apply to any particular case may only be known at the 
                                                                                                                                            
though the threat of compulsory licensing has been used successfully to negotiate price concessions 
from patent owners in some cases (A. Attaran, “The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, Access to Pharmaceuticals and Options under WTO Law,” (2002) 12 Fordham 
Intellectual Prop., Media & Entertainment L. J. 859 [Attaran]).  See also Human Development Report, 
2001 (Geneva: United Nations, 2002)[Human Development Report, 2001]. 
56 Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement provides that the Ministerial Conference and, between 
conferences, the General Council (Art. IV.2) have exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of 
TRIPS.  No interpretation can go so far as to amend provisions of TRIPS.  No interpretation has ever 
been adopted.    Decisions on interpretations are to be arrived at by consensus or, in default of 
consensus, by approval of ¾ of Members.  See Secretariat Compilation, above note 51. 
57 There is some debate regarding whether a compulsory licence would still be required in the country 
of import.  Some argue that a country may permit imports produced abroad under a compulsory licence 
under the doctrine of exhaustion discussed below.  See note 66 and accompanying text. 
58 This position is taken by the United States in its Second Communication, above note 44.  See 
similarly, Attaran, above note 55. Attaran also notes that an interpretation that allowed the manufacture 
and export of generic versions of patented pharmaceuticals to developing countries and not to 
developed countries could be inconsistent with the most-favoured nation obligation in TRIPS Art. 4.  
The one WTO case considering Art. 30 has said it should be interpreted narrowly (Canada–EU 
Patents, above note 32).  
59 An amendment to Article 30 addressing this specific point would be another way of resolving this 
problem, though there are no current advocates for this position. 
60 WTO Agreement, Art. IX.3 and IX.4.  To date, there have been in excess of 140 waivers. See 
Secretariat Compilation, above note 51. 
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conclusion of a dispute settlement case.
61  It seems unlikely, however, that a waiver or 
moratorium would avoid this problem.  Formulating the terms of the waiver or 
moratorium would require addressing the concerns noted in the preceding discussion 
of amending Article 31(f).
62
 
A moratorium on dispute settlement is contemplated in various WTO Agreements in 
specific situations, but there is no express procedure, short of an amendment to the 
relevant agreement to impose a moratorium in relation to an existing provision of 
TRIPS or any other agreement. One commentator has suggested that a moratorium 
could be the subject of a Decision of the Ministerial Conference which may deal with 
all matters under any of the WTO Agreements.
63
 
As noted, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health directed the TRIPS 
Council to find a solution to the problem of how to ensure that the compulsory 
licensing rules in TRIPS allow developing countries without manufacturing capacity 
to obtain access to affordable medicines by the end of 2002.
64  Apparently, all 
countries but the U.S. agreed on a solution by the December 31, 2002 deadline.  The 
U.S. could not agree on the conditions which would have to be satisfied for a country 
to be allowed to grant compulsory licences to export medicines.  Subsequently, in 
February 2003, the U.S. unilaterally announced that it would not initiate dispute 
settlement to enforce Art. 31(f) against any country issuing a compulsory licence to 
export to a country so long as the importing country  
•  is not a “High Income Economy” as defined by the World Bank; 
•  is facing “a grave public health associated with HIV/AIDS, malaria, or 
tuberculosis or other infectious epidemic comparable scale and gravity”; and 
•  has no or insufficient production capacities in the pharmaceutical sector and 
has so notified the TRIPS Council. 
All least-developed countries are deemed to meet the final criterion.  All other 
countries will have to demonstrate that they meet it.  The US Communication also 
specifies that all importing countries must issue a TRIPS compliant compulsory 
licence to import and, before doing so, must provide an opportunity for the patent 
holder to supply the needed products.  Countries issuing compulsory licences to 
export must notify the TRIPS Council of each licence and make details of each 
licence publicly available. In order to prevent diversion, to qualify for the 
moratorium, all production under a compulsory licence which must be exported only 
to the intended country and the licensed manufacturers must provide the means by 
                                                 
61  Second Communication from the United States, above note 44.  
62 Indeed, the US Dispute Settlement Moratorium, above note 50, itself imposes a complex set of 
conditions which raise interpretive issues.  See below note 64 and accompanying text 
63 Attaran, above note 55.  He suggests that the moratorium could be implemented by Amending 
Appendix 2 to the Dispute Settlement Understanding which has been done on at least two previous 
occasions.  This can be done by a decision of the WTO Ministerial Conference.  Such decisions must 
be taken by consensus. The authority of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council to take 
decisions is set out in Art. IV:1 of the WTO Agreement.  See Secretariat Compilation, above note 51.  
The moratorium on so-called “non-violation” complaints relating to TRIPS imposed by Art. 64.2 and 
discussed below was extended by a decision of the Ministerial Conference.  See notes 73 & 74 and 
accompanying text. 
64 In its Second Communication, above note 44, the United States said that there appears to be an 
“emerging consensus on the key elements of a solution.”  Recently, this consensus was evident at a 
meeting of 25 trade ministers held in Sydney Australia where agreement was reached on key issues 
related to compulsory licensing, as discussed below (Virginia Marsh “Cheap drugs for the poor deal 
boosts trade talks,” above note 9). 
TRIPS and the Pharmaceutical Industry in Bangladesh: Towards a National Strategy                             18CPD Occasional Paper 24 
which the product can be identified, either by packaging, labeling or product 
characteristics, such as the shape or colour.  Importing countries must take reasonable 
measures proportionate to their administrative capacities to ensure that medicines are 
not diverted into other markets.
65
 
5.  Exhaustion and Parallel Importing 
 
In the context of pharmaceuticals, parallel importing occurs where drugs that have 
been legitimately sold in one national market are imported by someone other than the 
patent holder into another national market in which they are protected by a national 
patent.  Such parallel importing is permitted under the domestic laws of some 
countries.  Under these laws, once drugs are sold legitimately in one country by the 
patent holder (or a licensee), the patent holder cannot thereafter assert patent rights in 
relation to those goods.  The patent rights in the goods are considered exhausted when 
the goods are legitimately sold in the first national market and may be freely resold 
into a country permitting parallel importing.  The justification for permitting parallel 
importing is that the patent owner has already been compensated on the first sale of 
the patented product and so should not be able to use the patent monopoly to block 
further sales. 
 
Parallel importing has been touted as an important aspect of a regime designed to 
promote affordable access to medicines.  Parallel imports compete with the patent 
holder’s product.  Where sales in a foreign market are at cheaper prices than those 
charged by the patent holder in the importing market, perhaps because the patent on 
the drugs has already expired in the foreign market, parallel imports can be cheaper 
than goods the patent owner is selling thus promoting more affordable access to 
medicines.  At the same time, of course, parallel importing reduces the economic 
benefit of the patent to the rights holder.   
 
TRIPS does not address when parallel importing should be permitted except in Article 
6, which provides that for the purposes of dispute settlement, nothing in the 
agreement “shall be used to address the issue of exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights.”
66 The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health affirmed that each 
Member has the right to establish its own rules regarding exhaustion of rights and 
parallel importing without challenge, subject to the MFN and national treatment 
obligations in TRIPS Articles 3 and 4.
67  One currently unresolved issue is whether 
this right means that Member’s are free to permit the import of products sold in 
another country under a compulsory licence. 
 
6.  Transition Periods and Post-Box Rules 
 
As previously noted, developing countries benefit from certain transition periods in 
TRIPS. 
•  Developing countries and transition economies were given until 1 January 
2000 to bring their legislation and practices into conformity with TRIPS.   
                                                 
65 US Dispute Settlement Moratorium, above note 50.  
66 The full text of Art. 6 is set out in Annex 1. 
67 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, above note 7, para. 5(d). 
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•  Developing countries which did not, at the close of the Uruguay round, 
provide product patent protection for pharmaceuticals or any other particular 
area of technology have until 1 January 2005 to introduce such protection. 
•  Least-developed countries have until 1 January 2006 to bring their legislation 




With respect to patents for pharmaceutical products, in accordance with the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, least-developed countries now have until 1 
January 2016 to provide protection.
69   
 
There are certain special transitional rules that apply in the case of pharmaceutical and 
agricultural chemical products.  Members that do not grant patents for such products 
relying on the transition periods described above must, nevertheless provide a means 
by which patent applications may be filed (called “mailbox applications”) from the 
beginning of the transition period.  A Member is not obliged to consider granting a 
patent until the end of the transition period.  When the transition period expires, each 
mailbox application is to be processed on the basis of its original filing date, applying 
the criteria for patentability as if those criteria were being applied on the filing date.
70   
 
This provision is designed to ensure that pharmaceuticals that could be patented if 
patent protection were available during the transition period do not cease to be 
patentable after the transition period has expired.  In order to be patentable, a 
pharmaceutical must be “novel” at the time of the patent application, meaning that the 
product must not be part of the existing state of the art.  A pharmaceutical being sold 
in a country during the transition period ceases to be novel and so, if not for the 
mailbox application system, would become ineligible for patent protection.  By 
establishing a mechanism for filing applications during the transition period and then 
requiring that patent applications be assessed based on the application of the criteria 
for patentability at the date that the application is filed, the mailbox application 
system protects developers of pharmaceuticals from losing their right to patent their 
products during the transition period.  The term of patent protection is calculated from 
the date the mailbox application is filed, even though protection only begins when the 
patent is granted. 
 
Finally, if a mailbox application has been filed and authorization for marketing a 
pharmaceutical product is obtained in a Member during the transition period, the 
Member concerned must, subject to certain conditions, allow a patent owner to obtain 
an exclusive marketing right for the product for five years, or until a product patent is 
granted or refused, whichever is shorter.
71  The extension of the deadline for 
providing patent protection for pharmaceuticals for least-developed countries to 2016 
decided on at Doha did not refer to their obligations to put in place a system of 
                                                 
68 TRIPS Art. 65.  These extended transition periods do not apply to the basic national treatment and 
most favoured nation obligations in TRIPS Arts. 3 and 4. 
69 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, above note 7, para. 7.  
70 TRIPS Art. 70.8.  Where another priority date is available based on a convention, the criteria for 
patentability must be applied based on that priority date. 
71  TRIPS Art. 70.9.  Also, in order to be able to obtain exclusive marketing rights, the applicant must 
have filed a patent application, been granted a patent and obtained marketing approval for the product 
in another WTO Member. 
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exclusive marketing rights.  Subsequently, the TRIPS Council recommended to the 




Finally, there is a transition period relating to WTO dispute settlement.  The 
obligations of the TRIPS Agreement are subject to WTO dispute settlement 
procedures.  TRIPS provided, however, that until January 1, 2000, only breaches of 
TRIPS could be the subject of dispute settlement procedures.  A Member could not 
claim that a benefit accruing to it under TRIPS was being nullified or impaired by the 
measures of another Member where there was no conflict with a specific provision of 
TRIPS.
73  The WTO Ministerial Conference was empowered to decide, based on a 
recommendation of the TRIPS Council that this moratorium on such “non-violation” 
complaints should be extended.  Prior to Doha, however, this matter was still under 
consideration in the TRIPS Council.  At Doha, the Members directed the TRIPS 
Council to continue its examination of the appropriate “scope and modalities” for 
such complaints and make recommendations to the next Ministerial Conference in 
2003.  In the meantime, Members agreed not to initiate such complaints.
74
 
  7.   Technical Assistance and Technology Transfer 
 
In order to ensure that the least-developed countries receive benefits from TRIPS, 
Article 66.2 requires developed country Members to provide incentives to enterprises 
and institutions in their territories to promote and encourage technology transfer to 
least-developed country members.  Many least-developed country Members have 
expressed their concern that developed country Members have not been fulfilling their 
obligations under this provision.  The commitment of developed countries was 
affirmed in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.
75  In the Doha 
Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, the Members affirmed the 
mandatory nature of these obligations and directed the TRIPS Council to put in place 
a mechanism to ensure monitoring and full implementation of the obligations.  As 
well, all developed country Members were directed to submit detailed reports on the 
functioning in practice of the incentives they provide prior to the end of 2002.  These 
reports are to be reviewed by the TRIPS Council and updated annually.
76   
 
PATENT PROTECTION IN BANGLADESH  
 
In Bangladesh, patents are protected under the Patents and Designs Act, 1911, as 
amended from time to time, and the Patents and Designs Rules, 1933.
77 Patent 
                                                 
72 TRIPS Council Meeting, 27 June 2002 (IP/C/M36).  The waiver was submitted to the WTO General 
Council on 8 July 2002. 
73 TRIPS Art. 64.2.  These types of complaints are provided for under Art. XXIII.1(b) and (c) of the 
GATT 1994 Agreement. 
74  Decision of 14 November 2001: Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns 
(WT/MIN(01)/17)[Doha Implementation Decision], para. 11.1. 
75  Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, above note 7, para. 7. 
76 Doha Implementation Decision, above note 74, para. 11.2.  The least-developed countries, including 
Bangladesh, submitted a communication to the TRIPS Council outlining the considerations which 
should be relevant to establishing a monitoring mechanism:  Mechanism for Ensuring the Monitoring 
and Full Implementation of the Obligations under Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement in Accordance 
with Paragraph 11.2 of the Doha Decision on Implementation-related Issues and Concerns, 25 June 
2002 (IP/C/W/357). 
77 See generally, A.A. Khan, THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS, COPYRIGHT, PATENTS AND DESIGNS (Dhaka: 
New Warsi Book, 2002) for the text of the law and amendments. 
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protection can be obtained for the process of producing a pharmaceutical product but 
not for pharmaceutical products themselves.
78  A few patents for processes to produce 
pharmaceuticals have been issued.  Product patents, however, are what multinational 
pharmaceutical businesses principally rely on in other jurisdictions.  Compulsory 
licensing is permitted under the Patents and Designs Act, 1911 where the demand for 
the patented product is not being met to an adequate extent and on reasonable terms in 
Bangladesh.
79  No compulsory licence has ever been issued.   
 
As a least-developed country, Bangladesh has until 1 January 2016 to bring its patent 
regime into compliance with TRIPS by granting patent protection for pharmaceutical 
products.  Bangladesh is obliged to have in place already a system to receive mailbox 
applications for pharmaceutical product patents.  In all other areas of TRIPS, 1 
January 2006 is the deadline for TRIPS compliance.  Work is currently under way to 
make the necessary amendments to implement TRIPS’ obligations.
80
 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN BANGLADESH 
 
The options that Bangladesh has under TRIPS depend, in part, on the nature and 
potential of the domestic pharmaceutical industry.  Unfortunately, up to date 
information is not readily available on the current state of the pharmaceutical industry 
in Bangladesh.  According to a study by the United Nations Industry Organization 
(UNIDO), Bangladesh’s industry has the capacity to produce finished pharmaceutical 
products but lacks both the capacity to produce the key active or “therapeutic” 
ingredients for drugs and the innovative capabilities to reverse engineer drugs to 
develop generic competitors to patented products or to invent new drugs.
81  In this 
regard, UNIDO ranked Bangladesh at the same level as Brunei, Cambodia and 
Thailand but behind China, India and Indonesia.   Some have suggested that the larger 
local firms may be able to develop their own generic drugs as soon as 2005.
82
 
Generic versions of therapeutic ingredients are imported into Bangladesh usually from 
India and used to produce finished drug products.
83  For 1992, the latest year for 
which information was provided in the UNIDO study, the value of Bangladesh’s 
output of drugs and medicines was US$228 million representing an addition to value 
of US$110 million.
84  For the year 2000, Bangladesh imported US$84,000,000 worth 
of medicinal and pharmaceutical products and had negligible exports.  Some recent 
                                                 
78 Patent and Designs Act, 1911, s. 3(e). 
79 Patent and Designs Act, 1911, s. 22. 
80 Trade Policy Review: Bangladesh – Secretariat Report 2000 (WT/TPR/S/68)[Bangladesh TPR]. 
81 R. Ballance, J. Pogany, H. Forstner and E. Elgar, The World’s Pharmaceutical Industries:  An 
International Perspective on Innovation, Competition and Policy (UNIDO, 1992) cited in Note by the 
Secretariat: Available Information on Manufacturing Capacity for Medicines, 24 May 2002 
(IP/C/W/345) [Secretariat Note on Manufacturing Capacity].  This view of the Bangladesh industry 
was confirmed in “Making Vital Medicines Available for Poor People: Bangladesh (London: Oxfam, 
2000) [Oxfam Report], at 4. 
82 Statement by Samson Chowdhury, Chairman, Square Pharmaceuticals, at Centre for Policy 
Dialogue, “Dialogue on Doha Declaration on WTO-TRIPS and Public Health:  What’s in it for 
Bangladesh?” held in Dhaka, Bangladesh, December 15, 2002.  Mr. Chowdhury suggested that 
physical resource constraints would likely make it impossible for local producers to engage in all stages 
of drug production.  Basic ingredients would still have to be obtained abroad. 
83 Oxfam Report, above note 81, at 3, 4. 
84 This is the most recent information available from UNIDO according to the Secretariat Note on 
Manufacturing Capacity, above note 81. 
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To date, the absence of patent protection in Bangladesh and neighboring states, such 
as India, has done little to alleviate the desperate problem of access to medicines in 
Bangladesh.  One constraint is limited public spending on health care.  In 2000, per 
capita spending on health care was US$70, compared to US$3,724 in the United 
States.  For most of the 1990’s, public spending on health represented 1.6% of Gross 
Domestic Product.
86  Another constraint is the limited resources of the population.  A 
high percentage of the population cannot afford drugs at any price.
87  Partly as a 
consequence of inadequate access to medicines, a recent Oxfam report described the 
health care system in Bangladesh as “failing.”
88
 
In this context, the local industry plays a critical role importing ingredients and doing 
the final production of pharmaceuticals which are then re-branded for sale in the 
Bangladesh market.
89  Foreign firms have not found it financially attractive to supply 
most segments of the Bangladesh market.
   A few foreign pharmaceutical companies 
are operating in the Bangladesh market selling a small number of higher priced 
products to wealthier consumers.  Local firms, producing at lower cost, have been the 
principal suppliers of drugs to the Bangladesh health care system.
90  
 
In this situation, there are likely to be few benefits and significant costs to putting in 
place full patent protection for pharmaceutical products in advance of the 2016 
deadline.  The local industry would be precluded from importing generic drugs and 
ingredients for drugs, which are the subject of patents in Bangladesh.  While, in 
principle, licensing agreements could be negotiated with proprietary drug 
manufacturers who own the patents to permit continued importation of ingredients 
and local production of finished products, inevitably, the cost to the industry and, 
ultimately, to Bangladeshi consumers would be high.  Compulsory licensing would be 
subject to the strictures of TRIPS Article 31, including the payment of adequate 
compensation and severe limitations on the right to export.  Also, at the moment, the 
local industry does not have the technical capacity to use a compulsory licence to 
produce a generic drug from scratch.  Compulsory licences to import would be useful 
only if a cheap source of foreign supply can be found.  As discussed below, 
implementation of TRIPS rules in other countries may make this difficult. 
 
Any longer term benefits from patent protection associated with domestic and foreign 
investment in local production of pharmaceuticals, research and development, and 
technology transfer would seem speculative at best.  Local innovation would be all 
but precluded by a lack of innovative capacity.  Foreign investment by proprietary 
drug manufacturers may be attracted by low labour costs, but this advantage is 
                                                 
85 Statement by Samson Chowdhury, Chair, Square Pharmaceuticals, at Centre for Policy Dialogue 
“Dialogue on Doha Declaration on WTO-TRIPS and Public Health:  What’s in it for Bangladesh? held 
in Dhaka, Bangladesh, December 15, 2002.   
86 Balasubramaniam, above note 43, at 7. 
87 While no reliable statistics were found, Oxfam cites one commentator as putting the percentage of 
the population unable to afford medicines at “at least 70%” (Oxfam, above note 81, at 4). 
88 Oxfam Report, ibid., at 2.  
89 Many have cited the development of local industry in developing countries as an important aspect of 
providing access to medicines: e.g., Oxfam Report, ibid.; Abbott, above note 5; Sells, above note 8. 
90 Oxfam Report, ibid., at 7. 
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available in many places.  Finally, the administrative costs of developing a system 
capable of handling a flood of patent applications from proprietary pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and granting compulsory licences to local firms would be significant.  
While, ultimately, these costs must be incurred, there is no apparent advantage to 
doing so voluntarily prior to 2016. 
 
DEVELOPING A STRATEGY FRAMEWORK FOR BANGLADESH’S 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN RESPONSE TO TRIPS 
 
If patent protection is not provided for pharmaceuticals in Bangladesh until 2016, 
what are the implications of the current TRIPS regime for the Bangladesh 
pharmaceutical industry and policies of the Bangladesh government to support it?  
Creating the conditions for the expansion of the local pharmaceutical industry in 
Bangladesh involves one set of considerations related to TRIPS for the period prior to 
2016, and some additional considerations after that date. 
 




Under the current regime and until 2016, Bangladesh is free to continue to permit the 
importation of pharmaceuticals, and the production and sale of pharmaceuticals in the 
domestic market whether or not they are patented elsewhere, so long as they are not 
patented in Bangladesh.  As discussed above, only process patents may be issued 
under the current law and few such patents have granted.  This would seem to create a 
market opportunity for the further development of the local pharmaceutical industry 
as a producer of generic products during the transition period.  Nevertheless there are 
a significant number of issues relating to the ability of the Bangladesh industry to take 
advantage of this apparent opportunity.  The first major issue is how can Bangladesh 
ensure that its access to generic pharmaceutical ingredients is secure, especially given 
that the developing countries in which generic suppliers operate will be required to 
grant and enforce full product patent protection beginning in 2005, preventing the 
production of infringing generic products.  The second issue is what will be the 
impact of TRIPS on the demand for generic Bangladesh products both in Bangladesh 
and in other countries.  How these issues are resolved will have a significant impact 
on the ability of Bangladesh industry to exploit this apparent market opportunity and 
on the nature and effectiveness of Bangladesh government policies designed to 
facilitate the growth of the domestic industry. In the following section, a framework 
for analyzing these issues is developed and areas in which further research is required 
are identified. 
 
Certainty of Supply of Basic Therapeutic Ingredients 
 
In its current state of development, Bangladesh’s industry must import therapeutic 
ingredients, many of which are protected by patents in other countries.  The principal 
suppliers of such ingredients are producers of cheaper generic products located in 
India and some other countries.  By 2005, TRIPS requires India and other developing 
countries to provide full patent protection for pharmaceutical products and so firms 
from these countries will be unable to continue to supply these ingredients to the 
extent that they become subject to patents rights within the country.  Only the patent 
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holder will be able to authorize production and export.  Under the existing TRIPS 
regime, supplier countries may grant compulsory licences on patented 
pharmaceuticals to its domestic producers, but such licences must be predominantly 
for the supply of the domestic market.  Consequently, even if compulsory licences 
were granted, the production available for export to Bangladesh would be limited.   
 
As discussed above, by the end of 2002, the WTO was to have adopted some 
mechanism to permit Members to allow their producers more flexibility to supply the 
needs of other countries, such as Bangladesh, for purposes of safeguarding public 
health.  While the deadline has passed, work continues to find a solution.  The 
prospects for Bangladesh’s industry to gain access to generic ingredients will depend 
on how this is done.  The best outcome for Bangladesh would be one which imposed 
the fewest restrictions on the ability of Members, like India, to export to Bangladesh 
and provided the greatest certainty of supply to the existing industry.  Certainty 
regarding the conditions for supply will be a key consideration for possible foreign 
and domestic investors alike.   
 
Bangladesh would benefit from a regime in which India and other Members were able 
to amend their patent regimes once to permit generic producers to produce and export 
generic therapeutic ingredients to Bangladesh, without the requirement of granting a 
compulsory licence in each case.  This could be based on an agreed understanding or 
amendment of Article 30.   If countries put in place such amendments to their 
domestic law, there would be less risk that exports would be curtailed in the future 
through the actions of exporting states.  Legislation is harder to change than a 
discretionary compulsory licence.   
 
Currently, however, it seems more likely that some form of compulsory licensing will 
be required to permit exports to countries in need.  The Bangladesh industry would 
have greater certainty that it would have access to a reliable supply of therapeutic 
ingredients if it had the right to decide for itself whether it was eligible to receive 
imports from countries granting compulsory licences to export under some modified 
TRIPS regime.  It is clearly less desirable to have Bangladesh’s eligibility for such 
exports depend on the satisfaction of some inevitably arbitrary objective criteria for 
public health needs and lack of local productive capacity, the application of which 
may be the subject of divergent views.  Only if WTO rules permit Bangladesh to 
decide for itself whether it qualifies for exports under a modified regime permitting 
foreign compulsory licences to export can the Bangladesh government make credible 
commitments to investors that it will continue to be eligible. 
 
At least in the short term, Bangladesh would also benefit if few restrictions were 
imposed to guard against re-export of the pharmaceuticals it imports.  The 
administrative burden of putting place border measures to ensure that re-export was 
prevented could be very onerous.
91  If, however, drugs imported into Bangladesh find 
their way into third country markets and displace sales of patented drugs, the 
inevitable result would be enormous pressure on Bangladesh either to put in place 
effective protection or to cease importing altogether.  Indeed, recent history suggests 
                                                 
91 Bangladesh’s interests would also be served if there were no other administrative burdens associated 
with the decision that imports produced under a compulsory licence were required, such as 
requirements to notify the WTO as has been proposed by the United States (Second Communication 
from the US, above note 44). 
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that the US in particular but also the European Union and Japan will be aggressive in 
policing any new regime and likely to exert pressure on Members not to exploit fully 
any flexibility that does exist under the regime.
92   
 
There is some evidence to suggest that greater tolerance on the part of these countries 
has developed in the past few months regarding measures taken by developing 
countries related to public health.
93  The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health expressly affirms that Members have the right “to use, to the full, the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement” for purposes of protecting public health and 
promoting access to medicines.  The precise legal status of the Declaration in this 
regard is not clear.  While some consider that it may be simply a political statement,
94 
others suggest that it is a binding decision of the Ministerial Conference.
95  At the 
very least, this aspect of the Declaration must be considered a supplementary means 
of interpreting the TRIPS Agreement.
96  Nevertheless, in practice, Bangladesh’s 
ability to receive exports will depend on whether it can credibly assure the other 
Members of the WTO that there will be no re-export. 
 
Whatever solution is adopted to permit the export of pharmaceuticals without the 
patent owner’s consent, the ability of India’s producers and those in other countries 
with significant generic drug producing industries to supply Bangladesh will continue 
to depend on the autonomous policy choice of their governments.  Bangladesh may be 
able to rely on the rational self-interest of India and others to permit exports so long as 
a profit can be made on such sales.  The dependence of the supply of low priced 
generic drugs from India on Indian government policy with respect to compulsory 
licensing, however, will reduce incentives for investment in the Bangladesh industry.  
On its own, Bangladesh cannot ensure that adequate supplies are available. 
 
Also, whether compulsory licenses to export will result in a cost effective source of 
supply will depend on the effect of the requirement for the generic producer to pay 
adequate remuneration to the patent owner.  At some level, compulsory licence fees 
will increase the price of therapeutic ingredients to the point at which Bangladesh 
production becomes uneconomic.  What fees will be charged will be a function of the 
requirements of TRIPS and decisions of government agencies in supplier states. 
 
                                                 
92 Abbott, above note 5; Sells, above note 8. 
93 The U.S., for example, in effect withdrew its WTO complaints against Brazil and Argentina 
regarding their patent laws (cited above note 3).  President Bush has affirmed the policy of President 
Clinton adopted in 2000 that the US government would not put pressure on Sub-Saharan governments 
to change intellectual property policies that regulate HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals.  See Sells, above note 
8, at 212-213. By contrast, in 1996 and 1997, it aggressively pursued its complaint about India’s failure 
to implement a mailbox system to a successful conclusion (India Patents, above note 5).  US pressure 
on Ghana and Uganda is described in Oxfam Report, above note 81. 
94 S. Charnovitz, in “The Legal Status of the Doha Declarations,” (2002) 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 207, 
suggests that this is one possible view of the Declaration but concludes that the status is ambiguous (at 
211). 
95 Attaran, above note 55; Abbott, above note 5, at 491.  The process for the adoption of authoritative 
interpretations of TRIPS is discussed above in note 56. 
96 C. Otero Garcia-Castrillon, suggests that the Declaration should be considered a supplementary 
means of interpretation under Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 39/27 (1969)) in “An Approach to the WTO Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health,” (2002) 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 212.  It may also be considered a subsequent 
agreement between the parties which may be taken into account under Art. 31(3)(a) of the convention. 
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Until there is some consensus in the WTO about the circumstances in which Member 
countries can give permission to export to countries in need, like Bangladesh, it is 
impossible to assess concretely the magnitude of the impact of the imposition of 
patent protection in developing countries that are home to major producers of generic 
drugs.  There is no doubt that supply will become less readily available and more 
expensive. 
 
Development of Capacity to Produce Therapeutic Ingredients 
 
In light of the uncertainty regarding the reliability of traditional sources of supply, 
Bangladesh could seek to develop its own capacity to produce therapeutic ingredients 
as an alternative to continued reliance on imported generic therapeutic ingredients.  
Such a strategy would provide local employment and technology transfer and, to the 
extent that production costs are lower in Bangladesh, could lead to reduced domestic 
prices. With the 2005 deadline looming for India and other countries, generic 
manufacturers in those countries may be encouraged to invest in production in 
Bangladesh, where they could continue to produce therapeutic ingredients and supply 
not only Bangladesh but also other countries in which protection is not yet granted.  It 
is certainly possible, however, that governments in these countries would prefer to 
grant compulsory licences to export to these markets if this were permitted, rather 
than see the movement of productive capacity from India to Bangladesh.  This 
suggests that, paradoxically, Bangladesh’s domestic industry may be more attractive 
to foreign investors if TRIPS imposed tight restrictions on a Member’s ability to grant 
compulsory licences to export. 
 
To be successful, a strategy of developing domestic capacity to produce generic drugs 
would require both substantial technical assistance, as well as investment.  Some have 
advocated that some assistance be channeled toward the development of local 
industry as an aspect of promoting affordable access to medicines.
97  To date, the 
development of local industries has not been the focus of international assistance 
efforts.  International agencies like the WTO, the WIPO, and others have concentrated 
on helping countries conform their intellectual property rules to TRIPS while 
programs sponsored by other agencies, such as the current four-year World Bank 
program, have invested in needed improvements to health care infrastructure.  For 
Bangladesh to be successful in enhancing the capacity of the domestic pharmaceutical 
industry to the point at which it could produce drugs without relying on imports of 
therapeutic ingredients, significant new programs would be required.  Programs to 
enhance education and skills as well as public funding of research would all be 
needed. One possibility for facilitating the development of such programs would be to 
seek targeted assistance from developed country Members of the WTO in accordance 
with their obligations under TRIPS Article 66.2. 
 
Determinants of Demand for Bangladesh Products 
 
As noted, Indian and perhaps other foreign producers of generic drugs in developing 
countries be interested in investing in production in Bangladesh in anticipation of the 
2005 deadline for putting place pharmaceutical product patent protection in those 
                                                 
97 Report of the Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs, Hosbjor, Norway, 
8-11 April 2001 [Report of Hosbjor Workshop]. 
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countries and policies could be developed to encourage such investment.  There are, 
however, a number of concerns tied to TRIPS which will affect the likely demand for 
the products produced by the domestic industry and which, as a result, will influence 
the attractiveness of investing in Bangladesh. 
 
The prospects for the success of the domestic industry depend, not just on the 
domestic market of Bangladesh, but also on export sales.  Currently, Bangladesh’s 
exports are negligible. While there may be various explanations for this, it is likely 
that producers of generic pharmaceuticals in countries such as India and Brazil with 
very large and sophisticated industries supply most developing country export 
markets.  After 2005, Indian firms and generic producers in most other WTO Member 
countries will be precluded from supplying pharmaceutical products subject to patents 
in the country of manufacture, strengthening the competitive position of existing 
producers of competing generic products in Bangladesh.  These suddenly underserved 
markets in developing and least-developed markets represent export opportunities for 
Bangladesh producers and create an incentive for domestic and foreign investment in 
Bangladesh to develop productive capacity and to take advantage of these 
opportunities. 
 
In principle, some other least-developed countries that do not provide patent 
protection could also seek to develop their national industries to the level at which 
they could produce products which would compete with products produced by 
Bangladesh in their own national markets, in Bangladesh and in third country 
markets.  In practice, it is not clear that the development of the necessary productive 
capacity in any other least-developed country is contemplated or feasible.  One of the 
advantages that Bangladesh has over most other least developed countries is a large 
size of its internal market.  This makes it more attractive as a location for investment 




TRIPS rules will, however, limit markets for Bangladesh exports.  Bangladesh’s 
producers cannot lawfully export generic products into national markets in which 
patent protection exists so long as Bangladesh production is not by or with the 
permission of the owners of patents on the products.  Consequently export markets 
will be limited to those markets in which patent protection is not provided, because 
one of the following situations exists.  
 
•  A country is not a Member of the WTO and has not enacted patent protection 
for the pharmaceuticals. 
•  A country is a developing country or least-developed country Member of the 
WTO which has not yet enacted patent protection for pharmaceuticals in 
reliance on TRIPS transition periods.  
•  A country is a Member of the WTO, which provides patent protection to 
pharmaceuticals but has granted compulsory licences for the import of 
pharmaceuticals. 
                                                 
98 Statement by Samson Chowdhury, Chairman, Square Pharmaceuticals at Centre for Policy Dialogue, 
“Dialogue on Doha Declaration on WTO-TRIPS and Public Health:  What’s in it for Bangladesh? held 
in Dhaka, Bangladesh on December 15, 2002.   
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•  A country is a Member of the WTO and grants patent protection but the 
person who would be entitled to seek patent protection has not done so and no 
patent ahs been issued.
99 
 
As well, even after 2005, countries like India and Brazil may still be able to permit 
generic exports to some developing and least-developed countries depending on the 
mechanism that is ultimately put in place at the WTO to deal with permission to 
export without the consent of the patent holder.  Consequently, prior to 2016, 
Bangladesh’s export interests may be best served by tight restrictions on the 
circumstances in which such generic exports from Bangladesh’s competitors would be 
permitted. 
 
Assessing the viability of exporting pharmaceuticals from Bangladesh and the 
resulting impact on investment incentives would require an identification and 
assessment of the potential market of the countries in each category.  Research to 
make such assessments will be necessary as a condition of developing a viable 
national strategy for promoting the domestic industry.  As well, the prospects for 
existing generic producers to continue to serve those market under some new 
amendment or agreed interpretation of TRIPS would have to be factored in. 
 
Perhaps the most fundamental concern regarding the viability of any strategy to grow 
the domestic pharmaceutical industry is the purchasing power of consumers in 
Bangladesh and in other developing country markets to purchase Bangladesh’s drugs.  
There is significant evidence that most consumers in such markets cannot afford to 
pay even the costs of physical production by developing country producers.
100
  
Increased public spending to acquire drugs for national distribution would help to 
ensure a market for Bangladesh produced pharmaceuticals, but the low government 
revenues and the low proportion of public sector spending on health care typical of 
developing and least-developed countries make this infeasible in most cases.   
Mobilizing public and private resources is an approach has been successful in some 
developing countries such as Thailand
101 and Brazil.
102 It seems unlikely to be 
feasible in poorer countries like Bangladesh.  Substantial international public finance 
will be needed.  One element of such a scheme might be global drugs fund.  Efforts to 
establish such funds are already well underway.    
 
The focus of these efforts is on ensuring affordable access to medicines.  So far, there 
has not been an emphasis on supporting the development of local industries in 
developing and least-developed countries as a way of achieving this objective.  There 
is no reason for Bangladesh to expect that such public funding schemes would be 
                                                 
99 Many developing and least-developed countries that are not obliged to grant patent protection until 
the expiry of the relevant transition period, nevertheless do grant such protection (e.g., Angola and 
Mozambique).  Also, some patents are not registered in some developing and least-developed countries 
which offer patent protection. 
100 Oxfam Report, above note 81, Report of Hosbjor Workshop, above note 97; Balasubramaniam, 
above note 43. 
101 See D. S. Wibulpolprasert, “Mobilization of Domestic Resources for Essential Drugs in Developing 
Countries:  Case Study from Thailand,” presented to Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing 
of Essential Drugs, Hosbjor, Norway, 8-11 April 2001, describing the combination of measures used 
including public finance and collective procurement. 
102 Champ & Attaran, above note 5. 
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targeted to support the Bangladesh industry if a cheaper source of supply existed.  In 
this respect, one source of cheap supply may be the proprietary drug manufacturers 
themselves.  An aspect of the movement to address the global access to medicines 
crisis has been donations or deep discounting by both patent owners and large generic 
firms.
103  This is an imperfect solution to the problem of the lack of affordable access 
to medicines because it depends on the continuing goodwill of donor firms.   
Nevertheless, such programs could undermine efforts to establish a stronger domestic 
industry in Bangladesh by reducing demand for industry output.  Indeed, it is 
reasonable to assume that some proprietary drug producers will seek to participate in 
such programs to the extent that drug donations and discounting can forestall the 
growth of competing generic producers in countries like Bangladesh. 
 
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that the implementation of TRIPS 
rules in Bangladesh and other countries has complex and possibly contradictory 
implications for the pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh prior to the requirement 
for Bangladesh to grant full product patent protection for pharmaceuticals in 2016.  
The analysis is complicated by the still unresolved question of the extent to which 
exports of patented products by firms other than the patent owner to address national 
health care concerns will be permitted under the new TRIPS rules or a new 
interpretation of existing rules currently being discussed in Geneva.   The foregoing 
discussion sought to identify the categories of TRIPS issues and some of their 
implications as a framework for policy development.  This framework is summarized 
in the table below.  In order to more fully assess the constraints and opportunities 
created by TRIPS, however, further research needs to be conducted to determine the 
degree to which patent protection on relevant products actually exists in the 
developing and least-developed country markets into which Bangladesh’s producers 
may want to export and the prospects for domestic industry to achieve the ability to 
develop and produce active ingredients for pharmaceutical products.
104  Armed with 
the results of such research, Bangladesh will be better positioned to advocate for 
adjustments to TRIPS rules and, more importantly, determine what domestic 
















                                                 
103 “Glaxo to Block Access to Generic Drugs in Ghana,” Wall Street Journal, 1 December 2000. 
104 A profile of the industry would include, for example, listing of industry participants, their sales, 
market share, products, sources of supply, production, technical and innovative capacity, and reliance 
on patents and/or licensing. 
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Summary of Strategic Issues Affecting Prospects for the Domestic Pharmaceutical 
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2.  After 2016 – Designing a Patent Law for Development 
 
Introduction 
After the expiry of the transition period in 2016 or whatever later date is agreed to, the 
situation for Bangladesh dramatically changes.  In order to comply with its TRIPS 
obligations, Bangladesh must provide full patent protection for pharmaceutical 
products.  Inevitably, this will mean that access to medicines will be impeded, prices 
will increase and generic drug producers will have to seek the permission of patent 
owners to continue to produce some of their products.
105 More specifically, licences 
will have to be obtained by Bangladeshi firms from patent owners to import patented 
therapeutic ingredients and to permit the manufacture and sale of the resulting 
finished drugs.  The full weight of these changes may be mitigated if Bangladesh 
were to issue compulsory licences to import therapeutic ingredients from countries 
that either issue compulsory licences to export generic versions of these ingredients or 
otherwise permit the export of generic drugs to Bangladesh in accordance with 
TRIPS, and to permit parallel importing of therapeutic ingredients lawfully sold in 
other jurisdictions.  To the extent that the local industry has developed the capacity to 
produce therapeutic ingredients and finished products which are subject to patents, 
after 2016, continuing such production will require either a compulsory licence from 
the state or a negotiated licence from the patent owner.  
 
Export markets for goods produced under compulsory licence in Bangladesh will be 
more constrained, consisting only of those countries that are not WTO Members and 
do not grant patent protection or are WTO Members who must grant patent protection 
but are willing to grant compulsory licences for import.
106  In terms of patent rules, 
the export opportunities will the same for Bangladesh products as for those produced 
in all other WTO Members.  The special incentive for foreign investors to move 
production of generic products from developing countries to Bangladesh beginning in 
2005 will end in 2016.  Bangladesh will have an unqualified interest in TRIPS rules 
permitting Members to authorize exports without the patent owner’s consent on the 
most liberal terms, so as to be able to continue to serve some developing country and 
least-developed country markets prior to 2016. 
 
The significant new question that arises with respect to the period following 1 January 
2016 is what are the possibilities for designing Bangladesh’s patent rules to ensure the 
continuing viability of the local pharmaceutical industry?  TRIPS implementation will 
require substantial changes to the existing patent law.  In this section, some of the 
features of a revised development friendly patent law are identified.
107  In general, 
Bangladesh should seek to limit the monopoly of patent owners, most of whom will 
be foreign, to permit the widest possible scope for the development and 
commercialization of competing products by others in Bangladesh. 
 
Limit Breadth of Patent Claims 
                                                 
105 Barton Commission, above note 12, at 37. 
106 As noted above, the question of whether WTO Members may permit the entry of drugs produced 
under a compulsory licence is not resolved. 
107 See generally, Barton Commission, above note 12; Balasubramaniam, above note 43, describing the 
measures suggested in the Human Development Report 2001, above note 55; and  Carlos Correa, 
Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in Developing Countries (Geneva: South 
Centre, 2000)[Correa]. 
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The claims made in a patent application regarding an invention are what define the 
scope of a patent monopoly.  The broader the claims that an inventor can make under 
national law, the wider the monopoly the inventor can obtain.  Broad claims reduce 
the scope for competing products in the market, whereas narrow claims create greater 
opportunities for innovation and competition.  National laws vary in the nature and 
breadth of claims permitted.  In relation to pharmaceutical products claims can be 
restricted to the chemical structure or composition of a new product.  In some 
countries, like the United States, and, to a limited extent, the European Union, claims 
may go beyond the structure of the product to include its function.
108  The TRIPS 
Agreement is silent on the form of and limits on allowable claims and so Bangladesh 
would be free to adopt a patent law that requires that pharmaceutical patent claims be 
limited to the precise chemical composition of the product.
109   
 
As well, once a patent is granted, under TRIPS, it is left up to the national government 
to determine whether products not literally within the words of a patent claim are 
nevertheless equivalent to the patented product and so infringe the patent.  In the 
United States, a broad notion of what is equivalent is employed, strengthening the 
market power of patents.  Like other countries, Bangladesh law could provide that 
claims must be interpreted narrowly to permit the broadest possible scope for the 
development and marketing of competing products.
 110
 
High Thresholds of Novelty and Inventive Step 
 
TRIPS contemplates that the requirements for patentability include novelty, meaning 
that the invention is not already part of the existing state of the art, and represents an 
inventive step, meaning that the invention would not be obvious to someone skilled in 
the relevant trade.  The Agreement does not, however, prescribe the contents of these 
requirements and national approaches differ.  By defining these thresholds as 
imposing high standards for patentability, Bangladesh could ensure that trivial 
improvements in technology do not benefit from the strong protection provided by 
patents.  It is a common practice of patent owners in the pharmaceutical sector to seek 
to extend the effective duration of patent protection by obtaining a second later patent 
on a new mode of delivery of a patented drug (such as capsules instead of tablets) or 
some other small change in a patented product. Setting high standards for novelty and 
inventive step would help to ensure that a patent on a product was not, in effect, 
extended by a subsequent patent on a trivial improvement.
111  Limiting the 
availability of patents in this way will promote competition in the marketplace.  While 
setting high thresholds for patentability would exclude from patentability local 
                                                 
108 These differences were recently described in “Drug Patents: Make love not war – Viagra under 
threat,” The Economist, 8 March 2003, 60.  
109 Because TRIPS prohibits discrimination between fields of technology (Art 27.1), Bangladesh could 
not enact a patent law that adopted a restrictive approach to claims, which was limited to 
pharmaceutical products.   
110 The Barton Commission, above note 12, at 49, recommends such a strategy. 
111 The Patent Act and Designs Act, 1911, has a provision addressing this issue (s. 15A, added by Act 
VII of 1930, s. 11).  Correa, above note 107, describes a variety of other ways in which proprietary 
drug producers may seek to extend the effective term of patent protection by separately patenting an 
element of an already patented product or patenting a different form of what is fundamentally the same 
product (at 52-7). 
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inventions which did not meet them, it may be possible to set up another form of 
lesser sui generis protection for such minor inventions.   
 
In setting a high standard for novelty, Bangladesh should consider specifying that in 
order to be novel, the state of the art includes knowledge developed by or in the 
possession of the local community in Bangladesh, including traditional knowledge.
112  




High Level of Patent Disclosure 
 
As discussed at the beginning of this paper, full disclosure of information regarding 
an invention is a fundamental aspect of the tradeoff between the interests of the patent 
holder and the public.  Indeed, Article 29 of TRIPS requires that Members require that 
an applicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and 
complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art and may 
require the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention known to 
the inventor at the filing date…Bangladesh should take full advantage of this 
provision and require that the best known mode for carrying out the invention be 
disclosed and that the disclosure must enable the execution of all embodiments of the 
invention.
114  Again, such a requirement will facilitate innovation and the 
development of competing products. 
 
Exceptions to Exclusive Patent Rights 
 
As discussed above, Article 30 of TRIPS permits Members to create limited 
exceptions to patent rights in some circumstances.  The Canada-EU Patents case, 
discussed above, suggests a general approach to the interpretation of Article 30.   
Under this approach, there remains considerable flexibility for Bangladesh to put in 
place exceptions.  Many such exceptions, such as an exception for experimental use, 
are commonly found under national patent laws.  An experimentation exception is 
most valuable in countries with domestic industries with strong innovative capacity. 
Other sorts of exceptions may be of greater interest to Bangladesh.  The regulatory 
review exception upheld in the Canada-EU Patents case,
115 for example, promotes 
the entry of generic pharmaceuticals into the market and so may be a more important 
feature to include in Bangladesh’s patent law.   
 
                                                 
112 Correa, ibid., at 43. 
113 In the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, above note 7, the TRIPS Council was directed 
to look at the relationship between TRIPS and the protection of traditional knowledge.  Since Doha, 
there have been extensive discussions in the TRIPS Council regarding the problem of patenting 
traditional knowledge and how to address it.  One suggestion has been to create a database of 
traditional knowledge that patent examiners may have access to for the purpose of ensuring that a 
patent is not inadvertently issued covering such knowledge. Peru has suggested creating a system of sui 
generis protection for traditional knowledge.  See Minutes of TRIPS Council Meeting held June 25-27, 
2002 (IP/C/M/36/Add.1). 
114 Because production will usually not have commenced at the time the application is filed, the 
disclosure may not be sufficient to permit a third party to reproduce the invention.  In Canada, Vaver 
has argued that the requirements for and practice of drafting Canadian patent claims is such that it is 
often impossible for persons with access to the claim to reproduce the invention (D. Vaver, 
“Intellectual Property Today: Of Myths and Paradoxes,” (1990) 69 Can. Bar Rev. 98 at 123-124). 
115 Also known as an “early working” or, in the United States, as a “Bolar Exception”. 
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Parallel imports are another form of exception to the exclusive rights of the patent 
owner which should be permitted, though the benefits are likely to be small.  Parallel 
imports would permit inexpensive drugs legitimately sold in other national markets to 
enter the country and be sold free of the claims of the patent owner.  Parallel 
importing could enhance access to patented ingredients which can be assembled into 
final products by the Bangladesh industry.  The significance of permitting parallel 
importing will depend on the extent to which such products are sold in other markets 
and at what prices.  As a matter of general policy, however, with respect to 
therapeutic ingredients, there would be no reason not to permit parallel importing. 
 
By contrast, to the extent that imports are finished goods to be sold in competition 
with the products of the domestic industry, parallel importing may threaten domestic 
producers.  Again, the magnitude of this effect will depend upon what drugs are sold 
at what prices in other countries.   
 
It is possible to conceive of a parallel importing policy for Bangladesh that 
distinguishes between these two types of parallel imports.  However, such a policy 
may be found to be inconsistent with Bangladesh’s TRIPS obligation to provide 
patent protection without discrimination as to the field of technology under Article 
27.1.  In practice, any such policy may be hard to enforce and, most important, would 
be directly contrary to the goal of providing affordable access to medicines for the 
population.
116  On balance, permitting unrestricted parallel importing would seem the 
best policy.  
 
Strong Compulsory Licensing 
 
More elaborate provisions on compulsory licensing than exist in the current law will 
be a necessary feature of Bangladesh’s patent law after 2016.
117  With the imposition 
of patent protection, a licence from the patent owner will be needed both to import 
patented therapeutic ingredients and to permit the production of patented products.  
Compulsory licensing can be used to permit these activities where voluntary consent 
is not forthcoming subject to the requirements of TRIPS.  As discussed above, TRIPS 
permits Members to determine the grounds upon which compulsory licences may be 
issued though it establishes a long list of conditions which must be satisfied before a 
licence is permitted.   
 
One controversial ground for issuing a compulsory licence is “local working.”  From 
the perspective of developing the local pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh, a 
requirement that the patent actually be used for production in the country could 
encourage foreign direct investment in local production with its attendant benefits in 
terms of employment and technology transfer.  Some have interpreted Article 27.1 of 
                                                 
116 This conflict between policies which may benefit the domestic industry but which may impede 
affordable access to medicines is discussed below.   See notes 127-134 and accompanying text.  A 
related issue associated with parallel importing is its impact on market segmentation and tiered pricing 
schemes which, in general, would provide developing country consumers with cheaper products.  Some 
have expressed a concern that permitting parallel importing would reduce the effectiveness of 
segmenting markets (e.g. H.E. Bale, “Access to Essential Drugs in Poor Countries – Key Issues – The 
Industry Perspective” presented to presented to Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of 
Essential Drugs, Hosbjor, Norway, 8-11 April 2001 [Bale]). 
117 Bangladesh’s current Patent and Designs Act, 1911 already has a provision dealing with 
compulsory licensing, but it should be expanded in the ways described. 
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TRIPS which gives the patent holder the exclusive right to import product into a 
national market as inconsistent with granting compulsory licences where the patent 
owner would be willing to supply the market through imports.
118  However, there is 
no express prohibition on granting a compulsory licence based on failure to work the 
patent in a country and it is not obvious that this interpretation is right.
119 Where a 
patent owner was willing to supply the Bangladesh market through imports, it may 
still be more desirable to issue a compulsory licence where Bangladesh producers 
would be able to produce at lower cost and offer drugs for lower prices.
120  The 
feasibility of compulsory licensing will, in turn, depend on whether the local firms 
have the capacity to exploit the licence. 
 
Less controversial grounds for issuing compulsory licences are contemplated in 
TRIPS itself: 
•  To correct anticompetitive practices, 
•  National emergency or other situations of extreme urgency, including public 
health crises, and 
•  Public non-commercial use, such as to provide health care to the poor. 
 
In all these circumstances, TRIPS Article 31 permits a Member to grant compulsory 
licences without having to first make efforts to obtain a licence from the patent owner 
on reasonable commercial terms and conditions.  Even in these cases, however, 
TRIPS requires the payment of “adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each 
case, taking into account the economic value of the [licence].” Any compulsory 
licensing system implemented by Bangladesh must determine how remuneration to 
the right holder is to be assessed.  Obviously, the rate of remuneration will have a 
substantial impact on the ability of the licensee to exploit the licence and on the 
feasibility of using compulsory licensing as an alternative to voluntary licensing or 
direct supply by the patent owner.  Internationally, the approach to remuneration is 
variable.  In some countries, compulsory licence rates are a fixed percentage of net 
sales by the licensee.
121  In other countries, the rate is determined by reference to what 
a willing licensor would accept from a licensee. So long as the rate is “adequate” as 
required in Article 31, Bangladesh has significant flexibility in determining what is an 
appropriate.
122  Bangladesh should provide that royalty rates should be determined by 
reference to the value of the licensed use in Bangladesh, rather than in more 
expensive markets.  As well, the law should provide that the rate may be reduced or 
eliminated where the licence is granted to remedy anticompetitive behaviour as 
expressly permitted by TRIPS Article 31. 
 
                                                 
118 Bale, above note 116. 
119 The Patents and Designs Act, 1911 permits the revocation of a patent not being worked in 
Bangladesh. 
120 Where the Bangladesh producer will sell drugs at higher prices, the need to promote access to 
medicines would dictate that no compulsory licence be issued.  This is unlikely to occur in practice. 
121 For example, in Canada prior to 1993, the rate was 4%. 
122 As discussed above in relation to the Canada-EU Patents case, above note 32, where there is no 
consistent international practice regarding how an issue is to be resolved, a WTO dispute settlement 
panel is likely to accord deference to the solution chosen by a Member.  As well, it may be that the cost 
of compulsory licence fees paid by the state will be offset in the long term by a reduction in state 
expenditures on health care.  Brazil’s program of providing drugs to HIV/AIDS patients has been found 
to have this effect.  See Barton Commission, above note 12, at 43. 
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One issue, which will affect the economic value of the licence, is whether it permits 
the export of pharmaceuticals.  As discussed above, the rules defining when a 
compulsory licence to export may be granted, notwithstanding the operation of TRIPS 
Article 31(f), have yet to be finally agreed.  Post 2016, the Bangladesh pharmaceutical 
industry will have a new and unqualified interest in liberalized conditions for such 
licences, because Bangladesh firms will have to obtain them to export to most other 
markets.
123  Bangladesh’s patent law should take maximum advantage of whatever 
flexibility is agreed to by the Members of the WTO. 
 
The benefits of compulsory licensing may be lost if marketing approval for a product 
produced under a compulsory licence is made more difficult because the generic drug 
producer has restricted access to test data developed by the patent owner for the 
purpose of obtaining marketing approval for the patented drug.  TRIPS Article 39.3 
obliges Members to protect confidential test or other data that they require to be 
submitted as a condition of approving the marketing of a pharmaceutical product 
against unfair commercial use if the development of the data required considerable 
effort.  This obligation applies only to new chemical compositions.
124  The Barton 
Commission has recently suggested that, notwithstanding this provision, TRIPS 
permits Members to approve generic drugs based on the test data submitted by the 
patent holder. While this may be an aggressive interpretation of TRIPS, it is one way 
that Bangladesh may design its patent laws so as to facilitate generic competition.
125
 
Under the laws in some countries, such as Canada, a generic drug may be approved 
for marketing on the basis that it is similar to an approved patented drug.
126  This does 
not necessitate relying on the data submitted by the patent holder, but simply 
comparing the generic drug with the approved patented drug.  This Canadian 
approach is consistent with TRIPS and could be adopted by Bangladesh. 
 
THE LIMITED IMPACT OF PATENT RULES AND THE ROLE OF 
COMPLEMENTARY RULES 
 
This paper has focused on the TRIPS framework for patent laws both in Bangladesh 
and in other countries, and impact of TRIPS compliant national patent laws on the 
prospects for the development of the Bangladesh pharmaceutical industry and on the 
scope for Bangladesh to shape its own patent law most effectively to enhance these 
prospects.  It is essential to recognize, however, that there are significant limits on the 
impact of patent rules on the domestic industry.  The two most important are the 
limited application of drug patents to drug products sold in the marketplace and the 
                                                 
123 As noted above, export markets are likely to be more limited beginning in 2016.  Since all WTO 
Members will have to provide patent protection, only non-WTO Members and WTO Members which 
either have issued compulsory licences to import or permit entry of products produced under 
compulsory licence under their parallel importing rules will be able to import Bangladesh products 
produced under compulsory licences. 
124 Patent systems are expensive to set up and maintain.  Bangladesh will need to take steps to ensure 
that its patent system is streamlined and procedural to minimize costs of administration.  This will 
become especially important with the extension of patents to pharmaceutical products, since 
pharmaceutical companies are the heaviest users of the patent system.  Correa, above note 107 
discusses some ways in which the burden of dealing with patent applications may be reduced (at 83-
85). 
125 Barton Commission, above note 12, at 50. 
126 Bayer Inc. v. Canada Attorney-General, [1999] Federal Court Judgments No. 826. 
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prospect that some patent rules that Bangladesh could adopt to promote the 
development of the domestic pharmaceutical industry may conflict with the 
overriding public policy objective of providing affordable access to medicines to the 
population.   
 
Many essential drugs are off patent. Of the drugs on the World Health Organization 
Essential Drugs list, 75% are not currently the subject of patent protection.
127  As 
well, even after 2016, when Bangladesh must grant patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals, it will not have to grant patents to any drug put on the market before 
1996.  For any drug put on the market between 1996 (the date TRIPS came into force) 
and 2016, a patent need only be granted after 2016 if the person who was entitled to 
the patent filed a mailbox application in Bangladesh prior to the introduction of the 
drug into the market.
128  As discussed above, if no mailbox application has been filed, 
a drug sold in the market place without valid patent protection will not meet the 
novelty requirement.
129  Because only a fraction of drugs are subject to patents, patent 
rules will have a limited impact on the prospects for the domestic industry.   
 
For the same reason, patents will have a limited effect on prices paid by consumers. 
Many factors other than the existence of patent protection on a drug will have an 
impact on price.  The buyer’s market power, competition between producers, 
transparency of procurement (lack of corruption), obstacles to trade diversion and the 
volume and duration of purchases are all factors affecting prices.
130  As well, factors 
including sustainable and adequate financing, reliable health care and supply systems 
as much as affordable prices will affect access to medicines in Bangladesh and 
elsewhere.
131    
 
Notwithstanding the limited impact of patent rules on the domestic industry and on 
access to medicines, in some circumstances, patent rules that will best promote the 
interests of the domestic industry may imperil access to medicines.  As a 
consequence, a single-minded focus on the domestic industry risks losing sight of the 
fundamental problem of ensuring affordable access to medicines.   
 
For example, Bangladesh may want to support tight restrictions on the ability of India 
and others to grant compulsory licences to export therapeutic ingredients to 
Bangladesh beginning in 2005 when they are required to put in place full product 
patent protection in order to encourage generic producers in these to jurisdictions to 
move their production to Bangladesh.  Until 2016, tight restrictions will also inhibit 
the ability of these producers to compete in certain export markets with products from 
Bangladesh.  At the same time, however, access to medicines in Bangladesh may not 
be promoted by such restrictions.  Compulsory licensing, at least in the short term, 
might result in lower domestic prices. 
 
                                                 
127 Barton Commission, ibid., at 35. 
128 As discussed above this is only true because Bangladesh is not required to grant exclusive marketing 
rights.  See note 72 and accompanying text. 
129 It is also true, however, that the increasing number of drugs, which are immune to existing drugs, 
will make new drugs more important   These new drugs will be subject to patent protection.  See 
Oxfam Report, above note 81. 
130 Ibid. 
131  Report of Hosbjor Workshop, above note 98. 
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Another example of possible tension between efforts to support the development of 
the domestic industry and access to medicines arises relate to donations or substantial 
price reductions in pharmaceuticals supplied by proprietary drug producers.  In the 
past several years, there have been examples of multinational drug firms donating or 
deeply discounting drugs supplied to developing countries.  Their willingness to do so 
reflects, undoubtedly, recognition of the reputational benefits of such gestures, as well 
as the practical reality that most of the consumers in such markets will be unable to 
pay a sufficiently high price to make their commercial exploitation of the market 
worthwhile.  In some developing countries with established pharmaceutical industries, 
governments have been successful in inducing donations and discounts by the threat 
of compulsory licensing.
132  Developing the capacity of the Bangladesh industry to 
create and produce generic pharmaceuticals would enhance the bargaining leverage of 
the Bangladesh government in this way.  Use of a credible threat of compulsory 
licensing to induce large-scale donations or deep discounting by multinational drug 
firms will enhance access to a source of needed medicines at reduced prices.  At the 
same time, however, the industry will be precluded from supplying the same 
medicines.   
 
In short, when designing policies to promote the development of the pharmaceutical 
industry in Bangladesh, the limited impact of patent rules must be recognized.   
Complementary policies relating to taxation, investment and other areas will be 
required.  As well, government policy must reconcile the interests of the domestic 
industry with the larger societal interest in affordable access to medicines.  Working 
toward the critical public policy goal of improved access to medicines may constrain 




Even though there are other factors affecting the price of pharmaceuticals, it is 
essential for Bangladesh to pursue the right patent policy.  There is no trade-off 
between patent policy and other policy measures directed to other aspects of ensuring 
affordable access to medicines.
133  One way that patent rules will affect affordable 
access to medicines is their effect on the Bangladesh pharmaceutical industry, the 
principal supplier of drugs to the population.  This paper examined the prospects for 
the development of the domestic industry in light of current and possible future WTO 
rules on the patent protection of pharmaceuticals. 
  
For Bangladesh, there is little to be gained by moving to full patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products prior to the latest date permitted by TRIPS, currently, 1 
January 2016.  Prior to granting full patent protection, the prospects for the growth of 
the Bangladesh industry depend on the stability of supply of therapeutic ingredients 
and the likely demand for Bangladesh production.  Supply will be constrained 
beginning in 2005 when the large producers of generic drugs in India and elsewhere 
must themselves begin to give full patent protection for pharmaceuticals.  This 
problem is likely to be mitigated, at least to some extent by changes to the TRIPS 
regime, or, at least, an agreed understanding of the current TRIPS rules that will 
permit Indian and other generic producers to export to Bangladesh under compulsory 
                                                 
132 See Barton Commission, above note 12, at 42. 
133 This is the conclusion of the Barton Commission, ibid., at 39. 
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licences or some other mechanism.  How much this will alleviate the problem will 
depend on the conditions having to be satisfied in exporting countries and in 
Bangladesh before such licences are permitted and whether exporting countries 
exercise their discretion in practice to permit exports to Bangladesh.   The WTO has 
not yet reached a consensus on what these conditions are.  Continuing access to 
imported ingredients will be promoted by minimal conditions 
 
As an alternative to relying other countries permitting exports of therapeutic 
ingredients, Bangladesh could seek to develop the capacity of the domestic industry to 
a level at which it would be able to produce its own therapeutic ingredients.  Generic 
producers in India and other countries might be interested in investing in the 
production of such ingredients in Bangladesh in anticipation of the 2005 deadline, 
when generic production in their home markets will be severely curtailed.  As noted 
above, imports of ingredients into Bangladesh will be promoted if the WTO imposes 
few conditions on the ability of these countries to grant compulsory licenses for 
export to Bangladesh.  The opposite is true with respect to investment.  Investment 
will be encouraged by rules that severely restrict the circumstances in which WTO 
Members may permit their generic producers to export to Bangladesh.  Currently 
there is no consensus at the WTO on a significant relaxation of the constraints on 
compulsory licensing found in TRIPS.  Nevertheless, the operation of the TRIPS rules 
alone is unlikely to be sufficient to attract foreign investment.  Complementary 
polices, domestic public investment and international support for technology transfer 
to Bangladesh will all be essential. 
 
The prospects for growth in the domestic industry, including its attractiveness to 
foreign investors, will also depend on the likely demand for the production of the 
Bangladesh industry.  At least until 2016, there will be least-developed country 
Members of the WTO where patent protection is not granted.  In other national 
markets compulsory licences to import may be granted or patent protection may not 
exist for other reasons.  Generic producers in WTO Members that must themselves 
grant product patent protection by 2005 will be unable to continue to supply these 
markets with products subject to such protection.  Moving production to a hospitable 
host state that does not grant patent protection like Bangladesh may be the only way 
to continue to serve them.  
 
Investors will have to factor in, however, the very weak purchasing power of many 
consumers in those markets and the prospects for domestic and international public 
finance for drug purchases.  Perhaps the most difficult factor to assess is the 
willingness of proprietary drug manufacturers to supply developing country markets 
at low prices or even through donations in competition with producers in Bangladesh.   
 
As well, within the framework considerations set out above, formulating the right 
domestic policy will require further research and information gathering.  In each 
prospective export market, it would be necessary to determine issues like what are the 
patent rights for particular drugs that Bangladesh producers are interested in exporting 
to the market, and what competitors are able to sell into or produce in that market.  
Research into the likelihood that the domestic industry can move forward to develop 
the capacity to produce therapeutic ingredients and develop new generic 
pharmaceutical product through reverse engineering will be needed. 
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After 2016, the concerns regarding supply of therapeutic ingredients and demand will 
be similar, but, in addition, the window for foreign generic producers from other 
countries to maintain their market access to Bangladesh and other markets not 
granting patent protection by investing in Bangladesh will be closed.  As well, access 
for Bangladesh’s products to export markets will be the same as for products from all 
other WTO Members.   
 
By 2016, Bangladesh must meet the challenge of developing a patent law which best 
reflects its interests while complying with the mandates of the TRIPS Agreement.  
This paper suggests some of the ways in which this may be done.  In general, limiting 
the scope of patents, setting high thresholds for patentability, creating limited 
exceptions to exclusive rights and strong compulsory licensing provisions will be 
needed.  Whether these development friendly patent rules will benefit the domestic 
industry will depend significantly on whether the Bangladesh industry has developed 
the capacity to develop and produce generic drugs locally.  
 
While the development of the domestic industry will not address all impediments to 
access to medicines in Bangladesh, it may be an important component of any policy 
to do so.  At the same time, a focus on building local expertise, developing innovative 
capacity or at least imitative capacity in a manner that is consistent with affordable 
access to medicines has important benefits of its own in terms of investment, 
employment and technology transfer.  The extension to 2016 of the deadline for least-
developed countries to grant patent protection for pharmaceutical products and the 
impending requirement for developing countries to grant protection by 2005 opens a 
limited and uncertain window of opportunity for the domestic pharmaceutical industry 
in Bangladesh.  The timelines fixed by the WTO suggest that the time to take a hard 
look at the nature of this opportunity and how the domestic industry can best exploit it 
is right now.  This paper has set out some of the framework considerations for such an 
assessment. 
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Nature and Scope of Obligations 
 
…Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the 






For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the 
provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the 






The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare 






1.  Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement. 
 
2.  Appropriate measures, provide that they are consistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by 
right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely 




Patentable Subject Matter 
 
1.  Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for 
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided 
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
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application.
134  Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and 
paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable 
without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and 
whether products are imported or locally produced. 
 
2.  Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within 
their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect 
ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or 
to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not 
made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law. 
 
3.  Members may also exclude from patentability: 
 
(a)  diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of 
humans or animals; 
 
(b)  plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than 
non-biological and microbiological processes.  However, Members 
shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by 
an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof.  The 
provisions of this subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the 






1.  A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: 
 
(a)  where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third 
parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of:  making, 
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing
135 for these purposes that 
product; 
  
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent 
third parties not having the owner’s consent from the act of 
using the process, and from the acts of:  using, offering for 
sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the 
product obtained directly by that process. 
 
2.  Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the 




                                                 
134 For the purposes of this Article, the terms "inventive step" and "capable of industrial application" 
may be deemed by a Member to be synonymous with the terms "non-obvious" and "useful" 
respectively. 
135 This right, like all other rights conferred under this Agreement in respect of the use, sale, 
importation or other distribution of goods, is subject to the provisions of Article 6. 
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Exceptions to Rights Conferred 
 
  Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by 
a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 




Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder 
 
  Where the law of a Member allows for other use
136 of the subject matter of a 
patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government 
or third parties authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be 
respected: 
 
(a)  authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits; 
 
(b)  such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user 
has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have 
not been successful within a reasonable period of time.  This 
requirement may be waived by a Member in the case of a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of 
public non-commercial use.  In situations of national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall, 
nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable.  In the case 
of public non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, 
without making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to 
know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, 
the right holder shall be informed promptly; 
 
(c)  the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for 
which it was authorized, and in the case of semi-conductor technology 
shall only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy a practice 
determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-
competitive; 
 
(d)  such use shall be non-exclusive; 
 
           (e)    such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or        
 
                                                 
136 "Other use" refers to use other than that allowed under Article 30. 
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